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ABSTRACT
Treason Town: Cities as Traitors During the U.S.-Mexican War
by
Kelsey Foster, Master of Arts
Utah State University, 2022
Major Professor: Angela Diaz
Department: History
Historians have long considered one of the main reasons for Mexico's inability to
defend itself against invasion during the U.S.-Mexican War was the disunity of the nation
and its population. Historians have propounded various causes of this disunity, including
class conflict, partisanship, and the instability of the central government. A closer look at the
war experiences of the cities of La Paz, Baja California, and Santa Fe, Nuevo-Mexico,
reveals another equally significant factor: localism, the prioritization of the local community
over the nation. La Paz and Santa Fe are two of several cities that capitulated to the U.S.
army, allowing U.S. troops to occupy the town without a battle—a treasonous action in the
minds of many Mexicans. The records created by the leading citizens of these two cities
reveal the thought-processes that led to this decision. These thought-processes prove just
how critical an analysis of the relationship between the local community and the nation is to
fully understand not only historical facts, but human behaviors and identities.

(100 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT
Treason Town: Cities as Traitors During the U.S.-Mexican War
Kelsey Foster
During the U.S.-Mexican War (1846-48) the U.S. army invaded Mexico from several
fronts. The Mexican Army was unable to prevent U.S. troops marching into and occupying
Mexico City, resulting in the transfer of a vast swath of territory from Mexico to the United
States. Historians offer several explanations for Mexico's inability to repel this invasion, and
one of them is the disunity of the Mexican nation. Evidence of this disunity can be seen in
the response of some local leaders when they were confronted with the invading army:
instead of fighting, they elected to surrender, allowing U.S. troops to occupy their town. This
decision was viewed as treasonous by many Mexicans. However, local leaders were not
motivated by any desire to overthrow their country; rather, their choices were prompted by
localism: the prioritization of local community affairs over national affairs. By examining
the war experience of two particular towns, La Paz, Baja California, and Santa Fe, NuevoMexico, it becomes clear that localism was a significant factor during the U.S.-Mexican War.
Furthermore, it becomes clear that an analysis of the relationship between the local
community and the nation is crucial to fully understand not only historical facts, but human
behaviors and identities.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
War is notorious for its ability to create no-win situations. The U.S.-Mexican War
offers a prime example, as Mexican citizens all over the country confronted a fatal
dilemma. The United States army was marching toward their city. Municipal leaders had
two options: wage a battle with untrained, ill-equipped citizens for soldiers, or allow the
invaders to enter without opposition. When the leaders chose what they believed to be
the lesser of two evils, local residents faced a similar quandary, as they were forced to
decide whether or not to support their leaders’ choice. Multiple cities found themselves
in this predicament; those who made peace with the invaders and permitted the U.S. army
to enter the town without resistance became “treason towns.”
“Treason town” is a useful identifier for cities that reacted in a very specific
manner to the U.S. invasion. While not everyone would agree that making peace with an
enemy to avoid violence qualifies as a treasonous action, during the U.S.-Mexican War,
Mexicans who made peace with the U.S. army without putting up a fight were labeled as
traitors by their countrymen. There were two kinds of traitors in a treason town: (1) a
small minority who actively assisted the United States army, and (2) a somewhat larger
group of citizens who did not openly assist, but nevertheless approved of the decision to
make peace. Not everyone who lived in a treason town fell under these two headings.
The opponents of peace also fell into two categories: (1) citizens who hated the idea of
surrender, but nevertheless submitted to the peace, and (2) insurrectionists, who openly
opposed the U.S. army's occupation. It is is safe to assume that active traitors were in the
minority in a treason town. What is less clear is how many of the compliant citizens were
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approving, and how many were resentful. Regardless of their feelings, the compliance of
a majority of citizens in a treason town permitted the U.S. army to occupy the city
without interruption (though not necessarily without difficulty). Thus, the three
qualifications of a treason town were (1) the local government allowed the U.S. troops to
enter and occupy the town without a battle; (2) the majority of residents of the city did
not violently oppose the ensuing occupation, and (3) a number of citizens actively and
willingly assisted the U.S. soldiers.
La Paz, Baja California, and Santa Fe, Nuevo-Mexico, were examples of treason
towns. They were not the only two cities to qualify, but they are the focus of this paper.
Together they make an interesting study, with several characteristics in common: they
were far from the center of Mexico; they were located in territories which the United
States desired to possess; and they lacked supplies and men. There were also several
differences: one had a significant amount of interaction with foreigners, while the other
had limited international contact; one was still battling neighboring Native American
tribes such as the Comanche, the Apache, and the Navajo, while the other occupied the
land of a people who were virtually extinct; finally, one became part of the United States,
while the other was “left...to suffer at the hands of their...brethren” because of their
treason.1
This study focuses on the experiences of traitors and traitorous communities.
Similar studies often avoid using these terms, preferring to classify them as rebels. This
may be due to a perception that "treason" and "traitor" imply judgment and
condemnation. However, it is a mistake to avoid using these terms in certain contexts.
1

E. Gould Buffum, Six Months in the Gold Mines; from a Journal of Three Years'
Residence in Upper and Lower California, 1847-8-9 (Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard,
1850), 171.
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There are several reasons why the term “rebel” does not suffice as a label for the people
and communities under consideration here. First and foremost, there were individuals
during the U.S.-Mexican War who could accurately be called rebels, but not necessarily
traitors. A rebel resisted the enforcement of laws or societal norms. Traitors aided or
failed to resist the state’s enemies.2 A differentiation between traitors and rebels must be
preserved in order to better understand the motivations of individuals, the potential
effects of their actions, and how they were viewed by other Mexicans. Nevertheless, it is
important to remember that the majority of those who were considered traitors by their
fellow countrymen might more accurately be called "accommodationists;" they did not
actively assist the U.S. occupation with arms or information, but they approved of the
surrender, and willingly provided food or entertainment. These individuals usually did
not consider themselves traitors, even if many of their countrymen did.
Argument
It would be easy to assume any conciliatory actions taken by Mexican citizens
during the U.S.-Mexican War were motivated by forced compliance, prompted by a fear
for one’s life. Of course, fear played a role, as it does in any war, but it would not be fair
to simply conclude traitors were more fearful or cowardly than citizens who chose to
resist. Indeed, many traitors put their lives in danger by their treason. They risked

2

This distinction between the two terms is based on legal and dictionary definitions. A
traitor is "one who betrays" or "one who commits treason" (Merriam-Webster, s.v.
"traitor," accessed October 10, 2022,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/traitor); a rebel "show[s] opposition or
disobedience" or "oppose[s]...one in authority or control" (Merriam-Webster, s.v. "rebel,"
accessed October 10, 2022, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/rebel).
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retaliation from their fellow Mexicans and some even took up arms to fight
insurrectionists. There must be more to the story than fear. That ‘more’ was localism.
Localism is an outlook which considers the interests and well-being of the local
community over those of the nation. “Local” is a relative term, and the area to which it
refers can vary. In the case of La Paz and Santa Fe, I argue that personal and municipal
localism shaped the choices citizens made during the U.S.-Mexican War. Preservation
and promotion of the city's economy, leadership, and security, or personal economy and
opportunity were the driving forces in the decision-making of paceños and santafesinos.
Sometimes localism broadened to include the territory in which the community was
located, but even this can be traced to the idea that the well-being of a municipality was
closely connected to the well-being of the territory.
I am not the first to argue that localism was strong in Mexico, particularly on the
frontier. For example, Mark Wasserman asserts in his book, Everyday Life and Politics in
Nineteenth Century Mexico: Men, Women, and War, that the “struggle to protect local
autonomy” dominated politics in 19th-century Mexico, and “decisions about which
[political] side to support depended on local rather than national situations.”3 This thesis
examines in greater detail localism's central role in fostering the disunity of the Mexican
population at the time of the U.S.-Mexican War.
Treason towns existed because there was a conflict of loyalties between the local
community and the nation. It has long been argued that Mexico was a disunited nation in
the mid-19th century. This disunity was evident in the existence of treason towns. Under
normal conditions, the two loyalties did not contradict one another so that loyalty to one
3

Mark Wasserman, Everyday Life and Politics in Nineteenth Century Mexico: Men,
Women, and War (Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 2000), 9.
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meant the practical destruction of the other. However, during the U.S.-Mexican War this
was exactly the situation that presented itself. Protecting the local community meant
betraying the nation; fighting for the nation meant the ruin of the local community. If
loyalty to the Mexican nation endangered the local economy, local society, local religion,
or local leadership, the citizens of a treason town prioritized the local welfare.
During the U.S.-Mexican War, both traitors and insurrectionists in Santa Fe and
La Paz were guided by localism more than by any strong feelings of either love or hate
for the Mexican nation. This had little to do with acceptance or rejection of a Mexican
identity. When the local community was at risk, its preservation was the priority,
regardless of whether it would harm another community or the nation as a whole. There
were many reasons why localism prevailed, and they were generally tied to the town’s
history and environment. Especially significant factors were: (1) geographic location,
which could affect the town’s resources and communication with other areas; (2) the
nature of the economy, which determined on whom the people relied for the necessities
of life; (3) the policies of the central government with regards to local autonomy; (4) an
atmosphere of insecurity, causing a preoccupation with local safety; and (5)
demographics, which impacted the town’s culture. All of these factors played a role in La
Paz and Santa Fe.
Historiography
While the idea that localism was common in Mexico during the U.S.-Mexican
War is nothing new, it has not been explored as a major cause of disunity. In Wars Within
War: Mexican Guerrillas, Domestic Elites, and the United States of America, 1846–1848,
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Irving W. Levinson recounts “several wars” that took place within Mexico during the
U.S.-Mexican War.4 The “wars” to which he refers were rebellions: actions taken by a
person or group of people challenging the social structure or legislative actions taken by
the Mexican government.5 Based on these rebellions, Levinson argues that Mexican
people were disunited as a nation, and this disunity was the primary reason Mexico failed
to make an effective defense against the U.S. invasion. In forwarding his argument,
Levinson suggests potential causes of the national disunity. He focuses on partisanship
(liberals versus conservatives) and certain “powerful and propertied citizens” having a
“greater fear of their fellow Mexicans than of the invaders from the north”.6
An analysis of treason towns (a prime example of Mexican disunity), casts doubt
on these explanations. It was not partisanship which most divided Mexicans, it was
localism. Political party did not determine how a person responded to the U.S. invasion.
Individuals of the same political persuasion behaved differently, with some choosing to
fight and others choosing treason. The role of class is a little more nuanced. While it
was not predictive, it was important. The lower class in one town behaved differently
from the lower class in another, so one cannot simply say that the lower classes in
Mexico were loyal and all traitors came from the upper classes. Nevertheless, a person's
class did influence his or her decision to support or not support making peace with the
U.S. invaders. For example, in Santa Fe, some members of the lower classes chose sides
based on the desires and influence of the dominant caudillo. In La Paz, many in the
upper classes felt they had more in common with the U.S. invaders than they did with
4

5

6

Irving W. Levinson, Wars Within War: Mexican Guerrillas, Domestic Elites, and the
United States of America, 1846–1848 (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2005), xiii.
Occasionally such rebellions might lead to treason (a rebel might turn into a traitor by
helping Mexico’s enemies), but not every rebel was a traitor.
Levinson, xvi.
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other Mexicans. This affected their choices. So class was certainly relevant in the
creation of disunity in Mexico, but it was not the primary cause.
Peter Guardino’s The Dead March: A History of the Mexican-American War, also
discusses the disunity that existed in Mexico. The crux of Guardino’s argument is that
the most significant reason Mexico failed to repel the U.S. invasion was not disunity, as
Levinson claims, but rather a lack of resources.7 He reasons that the U.S. shared many of
Mexico’s problems, such as internal division and leadership issues, so the only way to
explain the U.S. victory was the superior artillery of its army and its relative success in
keeping its soldiers fed. Guardino discusses disunity primarily as an example of a
characteristic which Mexico and the United States shared at the time of the war. In his
discussion, Guardino refers to localism, delineating the existence of regional divisions.
However, because he is most interested in drawing parallels between Mexico and the
United States (which also had its own regional divides), he does not delve much deeper.
In contrast to both Guardino and Levinson, Timothy J. Henderson in A Glorious
Defeat: Mexico and its War with the United States contends that it was Mexican
leadership which most contributed to the country’s losses, rather than the lack of
resources emphasized by Guardino, or the disunity stressed by Levinson. “Most of the
Mexicans who fought in the war against the United States had little incentive to defend a
government that did not represent them, and that, in fact, despised them,” he argues.8 To
some extent, the experiences of La Paz and Santa Fe support the argument that Mexican
leadership caused many of the country’s failures. However, Henderson does not
7

8

Peter Guardino, The Dead March: A History of the Mexican-American War (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2017).
Timothy J. Henderson,. A Glorious Defeat: Mexico and its War with the United States
(New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), xx.
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sufficiently acknowledge the role of localism. Dysfunctional leadership and disaffection
with the government forged the spirit of localism, and localism amplified the problems of
the Mexican government.
One other piece of work on the U.S.-Mexican War deserves mention. Historian
Dennis Berge published an article in the Hispanic American Historical Review called, “A
Mexican Dilemma: The Mexico City Ayuntamiento and the Question of Loyalty, 18461848.” In this article Berge recounts the experience of the municipal leaders of Mexico
City. He examines the conflict of loyalties faced by these municipal leaders, pointing out
that the leaders could not be loyal to both town and nation since the best option for their
city seemed to directly contradict the best option for their country.9 Mexico City does
not qualify as a treason town based on my definition: although many of the local leaders
contemplated or fully advocated capitulation, they were overruled by Santa Anna, and the
U.S. army had to fight to take possession. Nevertheless, Berge's discovery that local and
national loyalties were in conflict, and that a preference for the safety of local community
could override national concerns is very much in line with my own findings.
The U.S.-Mexican War was a borderlands conflict. The military strategy of the
United States ensured that the most decisive battles took place in the heart of Mexico, but
the fighting had a clear purpose: to turn the borderlands of northern Mexico into the
borderlands of the southwestern United States. Since the U.S.-Mexican War so obviously
revolves around borderlands issues, and because both cities under consideration were
located in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands, borderlands historiography is relevant to my
analysis. Indeed, the story of La Paz and Santa Fe is a borderlands story. The U.S.9

Dennis Berge, “A Mexican Dilemma: The Mexico City Ayuntamiento and the Question
of Loyalty, 1846-1848,” Hispanic American Historical Review 50, no. 2 (May 1970):
229-256.
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Mexico borderlands has a complex history with direct ties to modern politics and society.
Because of the rich and varied potential lines of inquiry, there are numerous
conversations taking place among historians. This paper will engage with two of them:
(1) the characteristics of U.S.-Mexico borderland communities and populations, and (2)
the relationship between these communities and the nation to which they belong.
A foundational work in U.S.-Mexico borderlands history, David J. Weber's The
Mexican Frontier, was an early attempt to "place[] [the northern Mexico borderlands]
squarely within its Mexican context."10 This was in contrast to a tendency before the
1980s to study the U.S. southwest solely from the perspective of U.S. national history,
ignoring its Mexican national history. Weber's sweeping overview of the period leading
up to the U.S.-Mexican War establishes the environment that led towns like La Paz and
Santa Fe to choose not to resist the U.S. invasion. One feature of this environment,
according to Weber, was the idea that “loyalty to one’s locality...frequently took
precedence over loyalty to the…nation as a whole.”11 This statement directly parallels
my argument. I will expand on this remark and apply it specifically to the experiences of
treason towns during the war.
Andrés Reséndez is another historian who considers the northern frontier of
Mexico (specifically Texas and New Mexico) during the years leading up to the U.S.Mexican War. He is most interested in the subject of identity, a common topic among
borderlands historians. Reséndez argues in Changing National Identities at the Frontier
that it was the collision of the "Mexican state and the American markets" on the frontier

10

11

David J. Weber, The Mexican Frontier, 1821-1846: The American Southwest Under
Mexico (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982), xviii.
Weber, 240.
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which "conditioned the identity choices of frontier residents."12 In other words, economy
was more important than nationality. My analysis supports this statement for the most
part. Local and personal economy were two of the most significant influences on the
choices of both traitors and insurrectionists. It did not necessarily cause them to change
their identity—they still considered themselves Mexicans—but it caused them to
prioritize one identity over another: they were santafesino first, mexicano second.
In Mexican American Colonization During the Nineteenth Century, historian José
Angel Hernández looks at the period just following the U.S.-Mexican War. He explores
Mexico’s efforts to repatriate citizens from the territories ceded to the United States.
Hernández's primary purpose is to challenge the theory that Mexico encouraged this
repatriation out of concern for the well-being of the Mexicans living in the lost territories.
He argues instead that it was primarily “for reasons of...national security, convenience,
and territorial integrity.”13 The vast majority of Mexicans chose not to repatriate to
Mexico, and Hernández offers several explanations for this. Unfortunately he ignores
one significant explanation: localism. Hernández fails to explore loyalty to the local
community as a clear motivation for Mexican citizens to remain in place. This paper will
help to remedy that deficiency, revealing the spirit of localism that prevailed in the
territories in question, influencing their decisions both during and after the U.S.-Mexican
War.
Besides participating in conversations on borderlands and U.S.-Mexican War
history, this paper also contributes the regional or community history of Santa Fe and La
12

13

Andrés Reséndez, Changing Nationalities at the Frontier: Texas and New Mexico, 18001850 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 3-4.
José Angel Hernández, Mexican American Colonization During the Nineteenth Century:
A History of the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2012), 21.
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Paz. Interestingly, both towns have limited historiographies. Works devoted entirely to
either city are sparse. Of course, as the capitals of their respective territories, the towns
are mentioned frequently in any historical analysis of New Mexico or Baja California.
Thus I will be engaging most with historical studies of these two states.
Baja California and New Mexico both receive treatment in an anthology of essays
edited by Laura Herrera-Serna called México en Guerra (1846-1848): Perspectivas
regionales. As the title implies, each essay is devoted to the U.S.-Mexican War
experience of a particular region of Mexico. Martín González de la Vara writes the
chapter on Nuevo-Mexico. González de la Vara is most interested in the resistance that
took place in that territory, rather than the capitulation. He admits that most of the
population of the territory did not "participate directly in" the insurrection, but claims that
"without a doubt they sympathized."14 This conclusion is in line with a common
tendency among Mexican historians to minimize non-patriotic actions of Mexican
citizens and assume the majority of citizens were patriotic. It is only in the last twenty
years or so that this attitude has been challenged.15 Regardless of this tendency, González
de la Vara fails to provide not only his reasons for conclusding that there was widespread
sympathy, but also his analysis of what motivated nuevomexicanos to act as they did—
either for or against the occupation. A discussion of localism would have strengthened
his narrative.
Ray John de Aragón is another historian who attempts to fill the void that exists in
New Mexican local history during the U.S.-Mexican War. What little has been written
14

15

Laura Herrera Serna, ed. México en Guerra (1846-1848): Perspectivas regionales
(Mexico City: Conaculta, Museo Nacional de las Intervenciones, 1997), 491.
Michael Van Wagenen. Remembering the Forgotten War: The Enduring Legacies of the
U.S.-Mexican War (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2012), 243, 245.
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about it, he says, is essentially myth. He seeks to refute the myth of a "bloodless
conquest."16 In doing so he spends more time recounting the violence that occurred in
New Mexico after the U.S. forces took possession of Santa Fe than he does in analyzing
it. Since he is most interested in pointing out the many wrongs endured by
nuevomexicanos, he does not have much cause to interpret their behavior during the war.
Both of the above works are samples of the small body of history that exist on New
Mexico during the War, and they prove that it is time to look beyond what
nuevomexicanos did, and further into why they did it.
The historiography of Baja California is even more limited than that of Nuevo
Mexico. In the mid-twentieth century, one historian did his best to begin filling this void.
The historian was Doyce B. Nunis, and it is impossible to conduct any historical research
related to Baja California without encountering his name. In The Mexican War in Baja
California: The Memorandum of Captain Henry W. Halleck Concerning His Expeditions
in Lower California, 1846-1848, Nunis drafted an introductory essay to provide context
for the journal of an American soldier stationed in the area.17 In doing so, he provides an
excellent overview of Baja California's experiences during the war. Nunis is interested in
the conflict and uncertainty the locals faced due to the actions of both the Mexican and
the U.S. governments. This uncertainty influenced not only the bajacalifornios, but also
the U.S. army and navy. Nunis's introduction is relevant to my own work because it
serves as a basic foundation for any study of Baja California during the War.

16

17

Ray John de Aragón, New Mexico in the Mexican-American War (Chicago: Arcadia
Publishing Inc., 2019), 12, ProQuest Ebook Central, https://ebookcentral-proquestcom.dist.lib.usu.edu/lib/usu/detail.action?docID=5743700.
Doyce B. Nunis, Jr., ed., The Mexican War in Baja California: The Memorandum of
Captain Henry W. Halleck Concerning His Expeditions in Lower California, 1846-1848
(Los Angeles: Dawson’s Book Shop, 1977), 17-87.
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For another study of the peninsula during the War, we must return to Herrera
Serna's anthology. The chapter covering Baja California was crafted by Ángela Moyano
Pahissa. Like González de la Vara in his look at Nuevo-Mexico, Moyano Pahissa
chooses to stress the opposition to the U.S. occupation, rather than the cooperation. In
doing so, she argues that "to understand the [actions] of the bajacalifornos...requires...a
brief characterization of the conditions of that territory."18 Moyano Pahissa recognizes
that local conditions were of prime importance in interpreting the behavior of
bajacalifornios when the U.S. invaded. However, she does not analyze how or why the
conditions caused any particular actions or behavior. In contrast, by examining specific
local conditions I will show how they created an atmosphere of localism which
influenced the citizens to act either for or against the occupation.
Sources
In a study of traitors and their motivations during the U.S.-Mexican War, primary
sources created by the traitors themselves certainly provide the best information.
Happily, such documents do exist. The most helpful have proven to be personal and
official correspondence and post-war reflections. In one case, an accommodationist
became a novelist, and her novels provide interesting insights. Due to the low rate of
literacy in Mexico at this time, the majority of these sources represent the more educated
or more wealthy classes, whom I call the "elite." Their words are invaluable for learning
what traitors thought and believed at the time. However, the elite often had trouble
sympathizing with or comprehending the actions of the less educated, who left few

18

Herrera Serna, 131.

14
records. Consequently, the actions and beliefs of the elite are the predominant study of
this paper. There is some analysis of the reputed actions and beliefs of the common
people, but lacking their own descriptions, concrete conclusions are more difficult to
come by. Furthermore, references to the experience of Native Americans are limited.
This is not only due to the record, but due to circumstances. There was not a strong
Native American presence within the boundaries of either La Paz or Santa Fe. Since this
study is primarily from the perspective of those communities, the experience of Native
American individuals and tribes will not be a focus of this paper.
Sources created by the traitors’ countrymen have also proven helpful, documents
such as newspapers and political treatises. They provide an outside perspective into the
motivations of both traitors and insurrectionists. These sources do contain significant
biases arising from political views. For example, a Mexican who subscribed to liberalism
would have a relatively-negative attitude toward the existing Mexican government;
therefore they were more likely to be sympathetic to traitors' motivations (though not
necessarily approbative of the result).
There are numerous journals and reminiscences of U.S. soldiers who served in La
Paz and Santa Fe which are crucial to analyzing treason towns. Nevertheless, the bias of
these sources can be extreme. Many, if not most, U.S. soldiers believed Mexicans
belonged to an inferior race. This often caused them to record incidents emphasizing the
negative traits they deemed inherent to that race. Laziness, cowardice, and deception
were attributed to Mexican men, and promiscuity to Mexican women. Any stories or
judgments related to these ideas must be scrutinized and sometimes ignored. The
motivations which U.S. soldiers attributed to both traitors and insurrectionists were

15
tainted perceptions, and must therefore be used with caution. Correspondence among the
U.S. military officers contains many of the same problems as the soldiers’ accounts.
However, they had additional reasons to exaggerate or minimize the actions of Mexicans.
For example, a failure to truthfully report on insurrections or support received from
traitors could lead to the reassignment of troops. If an officer wanted more troops to be
assigned to the area, he might overstate the danger caused by an insurrection or
understate the support he was receiving from traitors. If he was hoping to make himself
look well in the eyes of his superiors, the opposite could be true. Therefore, like the
soldiers, officers were susceptible to misrepresenting the motivations of the traitors. Any
observations relating to such matters cannot be accepted without question. Reports
relating to the actions of traitors or insurrectionists must be interpreted based on what the
officer is trying to accomplish through the correspondence, and preferably confirmed by
the words of the traitors themselves.
All of the primary sources above, in spite of their various biases, paint a similar
picture. That is of “...a society...divided by opposed and incompatible interests.”19 These
incompatible interests were primarily between the local community and the national
community. Due to the prevalence of localism, the local community often came first. Of
course, localism is not inevitably accompanied by national disloyalty. Furthermore,
national disloyalty has many potential causes besides localism. Nevertheless, in the
experience of two treason towns, localism was the primary factor guiding the decisions of
both traitors and insurrectionists.

19

Dennis E. Berge, trans. and ed., Considerations on the Political and Social Situation of
The Mexican Republic 1847 (Austin: Texas Western Press, 1975), 11.
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This paper is organized into three parts, with a chapter devoted to each treason
town under consideration, and a conclusion which contains a brief description of the fate
of each community after the war. The town chapters are also divided into three sections.
The first demonstrates the existence of localism in the town by exploring its origins and
manifestations. The second recounts the U.S. invasion and examines how the citizens’
reactions reflected localism. The third section considers the insurrections that occurred
against U.S. occupation, further emphasizing localism’s power to influence not only
traitors, but those who opposed them.
The power of localism among the Mexican population during the U.S.-Mexican
War should not be ignored. The existence of class conflict and partisanship have received
a great deal of attention in studies of Mexican society. However, these were not the main
influence on Mexicans’ attitudes during the war. The common tension between the local
community and the nation-state was a significant aspect of Mexican life, an observation
that is relevant not only to U.S.-Mexican War historians, but to borderland historians, as
well. It is crucial to understand the power and influence localism can have on a
population. The spirit of localism is apparent in cultures and societies around the world,
both past and present. We must be able to recognize and acknowledge it if we are to gain
a truer understanding of why people do what they do.
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Chapter 2
Santa Fe, Nuevo-Mexico
The town of Santa Fe grew up “in a wide plain, surrounded on all sides by
mountains.”20 It was the capital of the vast territory of Nuevo-Mexico and 3,000 out of an
estimated 70,000 nuevomexicanos lived within its borders. If one counted nearby settlements
within the town’s jurisdiction, the population doubled to 6,000. From a distance, more than
one observer from the United States claimed the buildings of Santa Fe looked like “brickkilns scattered in every direction.”21 This was their description of the flat-roofed adobe
houses. Pigs and dogs roamed the “irregular, narrow, and dusty” streets, and “three beautiful
streams” supplied water to the citizens.22 In the summer of 1846, this community faced
invasion by the United States Army. In the interests of the community, several local leaders
elected the path of treason, a decision which a significant number of santafesinos elected to
support.
The Community
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There were numerous reasons why the spirit of localism existed in Santa Fe and they
all related to the history and specific features of the community. From the beginning, Santa
Fe was a farming settlement; residents received a parcel of land which they were expected to
cultivate. Sitting at nearly 7,200 feet above sea level, the town was semi-arid. It received
too little precipitation to support a wide variety of produce, and the produce that could grow
required effective irrigation to thrive. The most successful crops proved to be the corn and
wheat that would eventually blanket the town. The majority of santafesinos were involved in
raising these crops, and most were consumed locally. This focus on local subsistence gave
the laboring class reason to be more concerned with the health of the local economy than
with the health of the national economy. According to a liberal-leaning treatise written in
1848, commercial agriculture within Mexico was stagnant: a bad harvest was devastating, but
even “if the harvest [was] good there [was] a great surplus of farm products,” and not enough
consumers; storage was too expensive so “the majority [of farmers]...[were] obliged to
dump” excess produce.23 Taxes on interstate trade further isolated the local economy.24
These hindrances to trade meant that a farmer’s prosperity was more immediately connected
to the community in which he lived, giving him a localized outlook.
Unlike agricultural trade, mercantile trade in Santa Fe did have outside ties, but they
were not to Mexico. The city was a literal transnational crossroad, a critical point along the
eponymous Santa Fe Trail. Although the origins of the Santa Fe Trail date from the early 19th
century, it was only in the 1830s and 1840s that it became a “major trade route between the
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United States and Mexico.”25 The 780-mile-long road connected Santa Fe with
Independence, Missouri. It took only six weeks for goods to pass from one end to the other.
This was significantly less time than it took for goods to travel from manufacturing centers in
Mexico.26 The importance of distance in a time when transportation was difficult should not
be underestimated.
Control of trade along the Santa Fe Trail contributed to the creation of a wealthy elite
in Santa Fe that, like the lower class, had reason to be concerned with local interests more
than national interests. Because of the Santa Fe Trail, santafesinos became less and less
dependent on their fellow Mexicans for necessities, weakening direct ties to the national
economy. Due to the limited opportunities for trade within Mexico, a merchants’ success
was not necessarily dependent the success of the Mexican nation. This did not directly result
in the prioritization of the local economy, but it resulted in Santa Fe becoming more and
more reliant on the United States, and this gave the citizens an “international outlook.”27 The
fact that the local economy had strong ties to a nation other than Mexico made the citizens
less likely to hold a national viewpoint.
The existence of the Santa Fe Trail resulted in international immigration, marriage
and business partnerships, all of which contributed to localism. The majority of santafesinos
were born in Nuevo-Mexico. Still, there were approximately 300 foreign-born immigrants
living in the Santa Fe area (10% of the population); most came from the U.S. (almost two25
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thirds), with the remainder from Canada, Germany, Ireland, Switzerland, Poland and
England. Individuals born in parts of Mexico other than the New Mexico Territory numbered
about 150, making a total of 450 santafesinos who were not born in Nuevo-Mexico.28
Simply having a populace born within the territory or coming from nations other than
Mexico did not create localism, but it did lessen the cultural influence that might have been
affected by a large number of Mexicans from other states, perhaps states with stronger ties to
the central government. While it is impossible to know for certain how many foreign-born
citizens actively supported the U.S. invasion, they did have less cause to consider themselves
“Mexican.” As Mexican liberals at the time observed, foreigners in Mexico did not “respond
with any interest to the fortunes of [the] country.”29 It is impossible to conclude that all
foreign-born santafesinos became traitors to Mexico during the U.S.-Mexican War, but it is
telling that there is no documentary reference to non-Mexicans joining the insurrection that
eventually took place. If a U.S.-born santafesino fought against the U.S. army it likely would
have been noted (and strongly resented) in military records or soldiers’ journals. Once again,
localism was not necessarily the immediate result of the city’s demographics, but it did create
an atmosphere less conducive to a national outlook.
In contrast, the danger of frontier life was a direct cause of local security taking
precedence. Nuevomexicanos lacked the military personnel and resources to combat one of
their greatest fears: their Native American neighbors. By order of the Spanish crown, Santa
28
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Fe had been founded on land unoccupied by native peoples, and very few Native Americans
lived within its boundaries. Those who did primarily worked as house servants.
Nevertheless, the city was surrounded by Native American tribes, and it was never
completely secure from attacks. One of the largest tribes in the area was the Pueblo, but by
the time of the U.S.-Mexican War, they were living in their own settlements and violent
conflicts were kept to a minimum. Relationships with other tribes within the territory of New
Mexico were more hostile. Nuevomexicanos particularly feared Navajos and Utes from the
north, Comanches from the east, and Apaches from the south. The failure of the Mexican
government to successfully defend the frontier against these tribes (by providing sufficient
military resources and personnel) created a strong dissatisfaction among the populace. As
one Spanish-born santafesino wrote in a letter to President of the United States, it would be
“‘[f]ar better to become a considerable portion of a powerful Republic’...than to be part of ‘a
nation...powerless to defend the citizens of this province from the thousands of hostile
Indians who surround them.’”30 Another Mexican observed that along the northern frontier
“the government of Mexico...lets its Indians live as they please, and its more civilized
citizens [must] take care of themselves as best they may.”31 This local danger weakened ties
to the national government. Knowing this, the U.S. army even used it to persuade the
populace to accept the U.S. invasion peacefully. The army would not have employed this
argument if it did not believe in its power to sway the people. This localized fear motivated
some santafesinos to cut ties with Mexico.
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Throughout Mexico, religion was a common rallying cry during the U.S.-Mexican
War, a means of unifying the people against the invaders. However, even worldwide
religions have local aspects. Like other frontier towns, Santa Fe suffered from a shortage of
priests. This, along with frequent interactions with foreigners of other faiths via the Santa Fe
Trail, affected the religious views of santafesinos. They became “more tolerant and receptive
to change” and some of the elite even went so far as to desire a separation of church and
state.32 The formation of local sects like Los Hermanos Penitentes created conflict with the
church establishment. Furthermore, a priest’s income depended on “donations...from
funerals, baptisms, and weddings,” or “the v[]olition of the faithful....”33 Consequently,
priests had reason to take special interest in the local economy and the local populace on
whom their livelihoods depended. Priests were tasked with protecting the welfare of the
religious adherents in their immediate charge, making a certain amount of local focus
inevitable. They also had to vie for influence and power, with each other and with the elite.
Controversies would arise revolving around political and religious disagreements over what
was best for the local community. Some of these controversies are alluded to in the records.
For example, the priest from Taos, Padre Antonio José Martínez, had a history of rivalry with
Santa Fe residents Manuel Armijo, Charles Bent and Padre Damasio Taladrid.34
Of course, rivalry was not limited to priests. Local rivalries among the elite were
manifest in a social structure known as caudillismo or caudilloism. Caudillos were local
strongmen who filled the “power vacuum” created by Mexico’s inability to “fund local
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governments.”35 They were “entrenched in local politics” and their “personal interests
superseded Mexican law.”36 There were two features of caudillismo in New Mexico that had
the potential to lead to localism: first, the national government could pose a threat to their
power (they often to “resisted centralization”); and second, their influence was tied to the
local economy and landownership giving them a strong interest in promoting both.37 The
importance of rivalry in guiding a santafesino’s decision-making was clear in political
writings of the time. One prominent local leader, Donaciano Vigil, drafted a pamphlet to
explain his opinions and the actions he took with regard to a forced government loan. In the
first paragraph Vigil explained why he felt the need to write the pamphlet in the first place; in
the second paragraph, he pointed out that Sr. General Mariano Martinez, a primary supporter
of the loan, was well-known to have “treated [Vigil] with enmity ever since he came to Santa
Fe.”38 In spite of this, Vigil explained, they were in agreement on this particular issue. Vigil
knew his readers would recognize that rivalries were relevant to political decision-making.
Rivalries among priests and the elite were a fact of life in Santa Fe, and they only added to
the spirit of localism. Navigating local relationships was of more immediate concern than
fighting for the Mexican nation.
Santa Fe’s localism violently manifested itself years before the U.S.-Mexican War, in
1837, during the Chimayo Rebellion. In the 1830s, conservative centralists came to power in
Mexico City. These were individuals who sought to concentrate authority in the national
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government and limit the power of local governments. Some of the changes they
implemented were so distasteful to santafesinos that they revolted (with other
nuevomexicanos) in the late 1830s. They were particularly unhappy with the appointment of
“outsider” governors and “a new system of direct taxation”—both matters of local
autonomy.39 Initially this revolt included individuals from both the upper and the lower
classes. Their declared goal was not independence from Mexico, but the removal of a
despised leader from power and the preservation of local power. While this reaffirmation of
loyalty to the Mexican nation might seem indicative of a national outlook, it actually proved
that the concept of local autonomy was more important than a debate over nationality. It did
not matter what nation they belonged to, it was the needs and desires of the local community
that were important; so important that they were willing to resort to violence. The rebellion
was eventually quelled by other nuevomexicanos, mostly from the upper classes. Although
the counter-rebels employed “patriotic rhetoric,” their motivations for putting down the
rebellion clearly involved local concerns.40 Elites who initially supported the rebellion turned
against it after rebels elected a non-elite as governor. The pronunciamiento issued by the
counter-rebels declared their primary purposes were to combat those who were “destroy[ing]
the peace, harmony and good order of the citizens, and… [to] suppress the outrages being
constantly committed on property.”41 When the rebellion became a threat to the local
interests of the upper classes (their safety, power, and property), it had to be stopped. The
counter-rebellion was successful. The rebels were driven out of Santa Fe and peace was
restored, with Manuel Armijo (the leader of the counter-rebels) installed as governor.
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Significantly, most of the problems that had caused the revolt remained unresolved.42 In the
minds of santafesinos of all classes, certain Mexican leaders and laws were still stifling local
prosperity and self-governance. Consequently, the already-existing localism had no cause to
abate.
Localism in Santa Fe and Nuevo-Mexico was also evident in the people’s response to
the Texas Santa Fe Expedition, in which a few hundred Texans attempted to draw New
Mexicans into their Republic. Borderland historian Andrés Reséndez identified two
recurring themes in his analysis of nuevomexicano accounts of this expedition: one was a
repudiation of the character of Texans (they were essentially labeled criminal rejects) and the
other was loyalty to the Catholic faith. Reséndez assumes these themes reflect
nuevomexicano ideas of Mexican national identity.43 This assumption is not necessarily false,
but it is incomplete. It ignores the local focus of nuevomexicanos, or, in other words, their
preoccupation with the local economy, local society and local security. One might just as
easily say that those two themes reflect ideas of New Mexican territorial identity, not national
identity. Nuevomexicanos saw themselves as a moral people with a sincere Catholic faith, in
contrast to the wicked Texans seeking to take away their “‘freedom and interest.’”44 None of
these sentiments were necessarily tied to the Mexican nation; they could simply apply to
local identity. Indeed, Governor Manuel Armijo expressed concern that “non-elite Mexicans
could easily be persuaded to support Texas” if the Texans were able to convince them it was
for their “advantage.”45 He feared any patriotism or national identity was not enough to
overcome more localized interests. Finally, a long-standing “anti-Texas sentiment” that
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continued even after both territories belonged to the United States implies there was more of
local feeling than national loyalty involved.46
Santafesinos had many reasons to focus on the local community over the national
community. Its agricultural economy was primarily local. Its mercantile economy was tied
to the United States. Most of its citizens were born in New Mexico. Foreign immigrants
were more assimilated into the city than the nation. Native American tribes threatened the
safety of the town, and the nation offered little assistance. The religion of the people had
local distinctions and the priests had plenty of local matters to occupy their attention. One of
the ways this spirit of localism manifested itself was in the political rebellion that took place
in 1837. It would manifest itself again in the actions of santafesinos during the U.S.Mexican War.
The U.S. Invasion
In May 1846, the United States declared war against Mexico. The U.S. military's
primary offensive would take them to Mexico City, located in the heart of the country.
However, because President James K. Polk's objective was to gain possession of California
and New Mexico, troops were also dispatched to those territories. Interestingly,
nuevomexicanos had long expected such an event. The expansionist designs of the United
States were well-known, and when Texas was on the verge of becoming a state in late 1845,
the leaders of New Mexico anticipated invasion. In January 1846, Governor Manuel Armijo
even went so far as to issue a proclamation to warn New Mexicans of the “potential
danger.”47 The potential for trouble only intensified when General Zachary Taylor moved
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U.S. troops from Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande in March of 1846. Although nearly a
thousand miles away, this was "an act of hostile aggression" because the U.S. army now had
a fort in territory long recognized as Mexican.48 The Mexican army attacked to drive the
soldiers out of Mexican territory. President Polk and the U.S. Congress used this as a pretext
to declare war in May 1846. Fighting began in earnest in the disputed territory, and within a
month, news reached Governor Armijo that U.S. troops were marching toward Santa Fe.49
The arrival of the army via the Santa Fe Trail was still weeks away, so Armijo had time to
prepare the city’s defenses.
During this time, Donaciano Vigil drafted several memoranda providing insight into
the state of affairs in New Mexico and implying the existence of localism along the frontier.
Vigil was an experienced soldier; he fought Native Americans in his youth and combated the
rebellion of 1837 as a sergeant in the Mexican army. Due to some confused circumstances,
his loyalty to the Mexican government actually came into question during this time, but the
testimony presented on his behalf convinced the judges that he was loyal to Mexico. Writing
on June 29, 1846, Vigil lamented the failure of a sister state (Chihuahua) to offer support to
Nuevo-Mexico during the impending invasion. Chihuahua’s failure to send support had left
him “in a state of uncertainty” whether the two states would be able to fight together.50 He
expressed a belief that Chihuahua was “envious” of the territory of Nuevo-Mexico (he did
not specify why), and that this resulted in “divided opinion that has abated the public spirit to
the point of...indifference toward the disgraces which the patria suffers.”51 Vigil clearly
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recognized the tendency of people in borderland territories to put the well-being of their own
communities first, and acknowledged that this could prevent Mexicans from uniting. It is
important to note that although the word “patria” might refer to the Mexican nation, it was
frequently used to describe any place which a person considered their “homeland.” This was
just as often the state or territory in which the person was born. Either way, Vigil saw the
existence of localism and recognized its power to hinder cooperation.
In late June or early July, a U.S. Major arrived in Santa Fe on a reconnaissance
mission; what he found convinced him that the “common people” were not interested in
opposing the invasion, but the “patricians” were.52 Mexican observers from elsewhere in the
country attributed this lower class “ambivalence” toward the Mexican national government
to the prevalence of localism among the population.53 A liberal-leaning Mexican newspaper
explained, the people “think...much about local conveniences” at the expense of the
“common good” because “after...years of sacrificing their particular interests” for the
country, they received in recompense nothing but “indifference” and “abandonment.”54
Mexican liberals recognized that a prioritization of local matters predominated because the
people had been forced to rely on the local community for any benefits and protection. As
one historian put it, these people saw “community loyalty [as] the path to survival.”55 The
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protection of the local community was the equivalent of self-preservation. The lower classes
were unsure whether fighting the United States was the best way to protect the local
community—hence their ambivalence.
The fact that elite members of the New Mexican population were more interested in
resisting the invasion was not necessarily because they were more patriotic than the lower
classes; it is just as easily explained by presuming that at this early stage the elite felt more
assured than the lower classes that opposing the United States was the best way to preserve
their local, personal interests. Many of the elite had initially supported the 1837 rebellion
almost 10 years earlier because, in the words of one Mexican observer, the governor at the
time had “neglected to consider influential men of wealth” when choosing his advisors.56
They switched sides when their interests were better served by putting down the violence.
The same nuevomexicano writer admitted that many of the elite were motivated in their
actions by threats to their influence and pride: the "capitalists" were "afraid of losing their
property" and the clergy "feared...that they would lose their privileges and power."57 There
had been little to no change in that tendency between 1837 and 1846. Conquest by the
United States threatened local, “personal interests.”58 Any insult to Mexico as a nation was
secondary. It just so happened that at this stage, the interests of the nation and the local
community coincided.
Governor Armijo issued a proclamation calling for volunteers to fight the invasion;
this proclamation further demonstrated that fighting for the Mexican national government
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was not a primary motivation. References to the Mexican nation were virtually absent from
the document. Men were called upon to be “Defenders of Independence and the Laws.”
They were ordered to defend the “Department” and to obey the “Government of the
Department.”59 The uniting cry was not to defend Mexico, but to defend Nuevo-Mexico.
These men were interested in thwarting the invasion of the United States just as they had
desired to thwart the invasion of the Texans, not necessarily because their ties to Mexico
were strong, but because they resented any attempts by outsiders to interfere with the
independence and laws of Nuevo-Mexico.
Significantly, the United States sought to counter efforts to organize resistance by
displaying a respect for local interests. Santafesino merchants who were in Missouri for
business sent word back to Donaciano Vigil that the U.S. commander had “offered his
protection...so that [the merchants] are conducted [back] to their country with all security.”60
It was U.S. strategy to avoid disrupting local business as much as possible. U.S. leaders
knew that such disruptions would only give the locals more cause to violently oppose the
invasion, whereas helping local businessmen continue to pursue their trade showed they
respected the local economy.
Early in August Santa Fe saw the arrival of three Mexicans who had been captured
and released by the U.S. army to give the locals an account of the U.S. army’s artillery. The
commander of the troops, General Stephen W. Kearny, hoped that word of his army’s
superior weapons would deter Governor Armijo from mounting any resistance. Kearny also
sent a letter to the Governor that officially communicated his intention “to take possession of
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the territory of New Mexico.”61 This communication prompted Armijo to gather with elite
santafesinos to determine an official course of action. Only one person voiced an opinion
against resistance: a Spanish-born priest named Damasio Taladrid.
Why would Taladrid, a Catholic priest, prefer cooperation? Priests had reasons to
actively oppose the occupation: besides being concerned about the people’s souls if they
became subjects of an anti-Catholic country, the priests had local concerns making a U.S.
occupation something to be avoided. For example, a change to U.S. authority could lead to
the confiscation and redistribution of church properties, which comprised one half to twothirds of Mexican real estate. One priest in particular, Padre Antonio José Martinez from
Taos, had long fought the encroachment of foreigners in New Mexico, especially when they
were granted land. Priests had to consider both the practical and the spiritual welfare of the
Church and the people. Taladrid had the same reasons to fear U.S. encroachment, yet he
chose a different course. The most likely explanation for this discrepancy was local rivalry.
Padre Taladrid had a strong, documented feud with Padre Martinez.62 Consequently, personal
feelings probably played a role in his decision to advocate for peace instead of war. The
actions of all priests had a basis in some form of localism, though they manifested
themselves in opposite ways. One priest was not more devoted to the Mexican national
government than the other; rather, one put the local interests of his Church first, while the
other may have been more interested in personal local interests.
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Outside of this council of elite, there was a resident of Santa Fe who was going out of
his way to “argue[]...that it would be better [to] ‘capitulate’ and become U.S. citizens”
because he believed doing so would be good for the local community.63 His name was
Manuel Alvarez. Alvarez had moved to Santa Fe in the 1820s, after becoming a trader on the
Santa Fe Trail. Born in Spain, he had migrated to the United States and lived there for a few
years before becoming a santafesino. His ties to the United States were so strong he was
appointed U.S. consul even though he was not a U.S. citizen. Furthermore, he began
“subversive activities” in favor of the United States even before the U.S.-Mexican War
began.64 While Alvarez certainly had a strong respect for the United States and its
institutions, his eagerness to promote U.S. interests in Nuevo-Mexico was not simply due to
a love of the United States, but rather to a resentment against the Mexican government for
not fully developing the great potential of Santa Fe and New Mexico. In a letter to a U.S.
citizen, Alvarez described the mining prospects in Nuevo-Mexico. He declared it was full of
untapped mineral wealth, and he blamed Mexico for preventing mining from becoming a
thriving local business. He explained that mining labor was generally left to the “poorer
classes” because “the jealousy and oppression” of the Mexican government “restrained [men
of wealth] from investing capital to any amount;” the poorer classes “cease[d] to work so
soon as they obtain a supply for present wants and vices.” 65 Alvarez thought U.S.
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jurisdiction and culture would serve the local community (and, no doubt, his own local
interests). Mexico was not fostering the local economy as he thought it should.
Those who advocated for battle instead of cooperation were motivated by localism
just as surely as men like Alvarez or Taladrid; they only disagreed as to what was best for the
local community. Santa Fe was “filled with soldiers and citizens gathered for the
organization of a force to resist the American advance.”66 Donaciano Vigil’s notes on the
history of New Mexico mentioned two reasons santafesinos were initially interested in
resisting the U.S. invasion: “defend[ing] the integrity of the Territory” and “assert[ing]...their
rights.”67 It was New Mexican territorial pride, not national pride. It was personal rights, not
national identity. As the resistance formed, the U.S.-born residents in Santa Fe began to fear
for their lives. They locked themselves in their houses, thinking their neighbors would
become violent towards them as enemies. No doubt they remembered the events of 1841,
when santafesinos had reacted violently against their U.S.-born neighbors on the occasion of
the Texas-Santa Fe expedition. This fear proved ungrounded; the most they had to endure
was insults.68 The fact that there was no violence was actually evidence that keeping the
peace in the local community was more important than asserting national pride. Indeed, it is
indicative that the previous response to the Texas invasion had more to do with anti-Texas
sentiment than it did with nationality. Five years had strengthened community ties between
Santa Fe and the United States. Whether they liked it or not, santafesinos had shared
interests with their U.S.-born neighbors that would be harmed by violence.
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In August, Armijo and several thousand men, armed and unarmed, set forth from
Santa Fe to meet the U.S. army fifteen miles from the city. Within a week, the U.S. army
raised its flag in the plaza of Santa Fe—“without firing a gun or spilling a drop of blood.”69
What happened to Armijo and the thousands of men who had marched with him? They had
dispersed without ever meeting the enemy. Some contemporaries and historians have
blamed Manuel Armijo for disbanding the troops, while others have claimed he acted upon
the urging of his fellow commanders. Regardless of whether it was his own decision or the
influence of others, Armijo dismissed the men and returned to Santa Fe with a guard of
presidial soldiers before fleeing to Chihuahua. An account written by the elite to the
President of Mexico certainly gave the impression that the locals were eager to use Armijo as
a scapegoat. It does not seem logical that the other commanders would have accepted
Armijo’s decision if they did not agree with it. They could have taken the matter into their
own hands, especially after he fled the department and appointed a successor. They gave no
excuse for their own behavior except that Armijo had refused to lead them.70 Consequently,
it is likely that the disbanding of the troops was supported by at least some of the other
leaders, even if they blamed Armijo for not having prepared a force capable of repelling the
invaders.
Around the time of his flight, Governor Armijo wrote a letter to General Kearny
protesting the invasion; his letter proved local independence preoccupied the people more
than national preservation. Its focus was on countering any claim by the United States that
69
70

House Executive Document No. 19, 29th Congress, 2nd Session, 1846, Serial 499, p. 21.
Hughes, 32-33; James Madison Cutts, The Conquest of California and New Mexico, by the
Forces of the United States, in the Years 1846 & 1847 (Philadelphia: Carey & Hart, 1847), 52,
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?
id=uc1.31822043013929&view=1up&seq=11&skin=2021&q1=%22santa%20fe%22; Herrera
Serna, 481; Report of people of Santa Fe to President of Mexico, September 26, 1846,
William G. Ritch Papers Concerning the History of New Mexico, 1539-1885,
https://nmdc.unm.edu/digital/collection/ritchpapers/id/1510/rec/39.

35
Nuevo-Mexico was actually part of Texas: “I say to you that the N. Mejico never has been
part of Texas,” Armijo declared.71 Nuevomexicanos were ever eager to thwart attempts to
unite them with Texas. Armijo emphasized this claim rather than the injustice of the
invasion, even though the idea that New Mexico belonged to Texas was not a justification
which Kearny used upon his arrival in Santa Fe; it was not even mentioned in proclamations
he issued or in his correspondence. One might speculate that from communications such as
this Kearny learned that such a claim was not only unwarranted, but also highly offensive to
the local population.
A group of santafesinos also sent a letter to the President of Mexico, excusing their
failure to resist the U.S. occupation, and one statement in the epistle revealed their localistic
view of their relationship with the Mexican nation: “at no time may it be said that we have
been unfaithful to the Mexican Nation, with which we have so many ties.”72 The last seven
words are intriguing. They could have been left out entirely. They chose to acknowledge
their “ties” to the nation rather than Mexico’s direct sovereignty over or possession of the
territory. This reflected a strong federalist view, in which each state or territory is an
independent sovereignty, equally joined in confederation with other states. Federalism was a
broader form of localism.
The evening of August 18, 1846, brought the U.S. army within Santa Fe’s city limits.
After meeting “amicably” with the town leaders and planting a flag above the governor’s
palace, Kearny ordered construction of a camp on a hill to the east of the city in preparation
for the long-term occupation and defense of the capital.73 Soon after the arrival of the troops,
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Juan Bautista Vigil y Alarid, the man Armijo appointed to replace him, published a statement
seeking to reassure the people that the U.S. forces intended no harm if the citizens remained
peaceful. He was eager to forestall an exodus from the city, almost reproaching the people
for “leaving their homes...[for] the deserts as if [the U.S.] forces” were “cruel and
bloodthirsty savages.”74
Vigil y Alarid's primary concern was to keep the local community safe and prevent its
dispersal. Flight was dangerous for everyone. It would not only put those who departed in
danger, by traveling unprotected through territory occupied by Apache and Navajo tribes, but
it would disrupt the local economy. Vigil y Alarid was not pleased with the U.S. occupation,
as will be seen below, but he thought submission was better for the local community than
dispersion. In a letter to Kearny, Vigil y Alarid expressed his sorrow that the territory was
obliged to submit to the occupation but the only practical path at this point was submission:
“no one in the world has with good success resisted the power of the stronger.” Vigil y
Alarid also indicated what he thought about the local community being the primary
consideration. Mexico was like a parent, and that parent had now “died in politics.”
Regardless of personal opinions, it was for the local population “to obey and respect the
established authorities.” What mattered was what was happening immediately around them.
While the two nations “arranged their differences,” the authority presently established in the
local community was that of the United States due to their presence there. The “particular
opinions” of individuals did not matter; a community might consider itself “Mexican” in
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theory, but what really guided local decision-making was the authority which had direct
influence over the local community’s well-being.75
Santafesinos, like many other Mexicans, had been taught to expect the absolute worst
from U.S. soldiers. Anything less than immediate murder, rape, and desecration of their
churches was a pleasant surprise, and resulted in a certain amount of rejoicing. The day after
the arrival of the U.S. army, santafesinos assembled in the plaza to hear what the commander
of the army had to say. Kearny’s words caused some citizens to shout for joy. Many U.S.
soldiers attributed such shouts to happiness at the prospect of leaving the Mexican nation and
joining themselves to the United States. They were more likely shouts of relief. Kearny’s
words promised a better situation than they expected.
Kearny spoke to the matters of greatest concern to santafesinos, and at least three of
them were localized: (1) fear of violence, (2) protection from Native Americans, and (3) local
governance. For the first, Kearny promised that safety and security was guaranteed for the
local community through cooperation. For the second, he declared that the U.S. army was
going to assist the locals in the long-standing conflicts with the Comanche, Ute, Apache and
Navajo tribes. For the third, he stated that the people’s right to govern themselves would be
preserved. Town leaders were permitted to keep their offices so long as they took an oath of
allegiance to the United States. Governor Juan Bautista Vigil y Alarid, Secretary Donaciano
Vigil, Alcalde Francisco Armijo y Ortiz, and Prefect Julien Tenoira all submitted to this
requirement. However, only one retained office over the long term. Possibly due to a lack of
faith in their willingness to cooperate, Vigil y Alarid, Armijo y Ortiz, and Tenoira were
eventually replaced. Kearny appointed Charles Bent, a U.S.-born nuevomexicano, to be
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Governor. Francisco Sarracino became the new prefect, and Miguel Romero the new alcalde.
Donaciano Vigil remained the Secretary. Two other notable positions were filled by native
nuevomexicanos: Tomas Rivero became the collector, and Antonio Jose Otero was one of
three judges.76 While Kearny had to ensure the government leaders were cooperative with
the U.S. army, he did his best to appoint local citizens whenever possible, knowing the
preference for local governance. A desire for local self-governance and independence had
long been a point of contention between santafesinos and the Mexican government; foster
this and the people had less reason to resent the change in national authority.
Within the capital, Kearny was doing all he could to keep the santafesinos content,
primarily by supporting local interests. He attended Mass and “put on a ball” for the
citizens.77 Respect for and promotion of the local religion and local recreation fostered
cooperation. Kearny also reduced taxes and injurious duties. He abolished a hated law
imposed by Mexico, the requirement to use “stamped paper” for “certain transactions.”78 He
issued orders regarding the collection of licensing fees, and declared that the money collected
would “be turned over to the treasurer of [Santa Fe] for the benefit thereof.”79 This gave
santafesinos less reason to fight against the U.S. army to protect their “material interests,” a
motivation other Mexicans realized was practically necessary if one was to expect them to be
active in the defense of Mexico.80 Perhaps most important of all, Kearny diligently worked
to make peace with the neighboring Native American tribes, and was to some extent
successful (temporarily). This local concern had particularly strong persuasive power. If
Kearny was able to solve this long-standing issue, the hearts of the people would be more
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inclined toward their protectors. Kearny was well aware that as long as the people did not
see him and his men as a threat to their religion and their daily life, they would have little
cause to rise against him. If they saw him and his men as protectors of lives and property,
they had little reason to oppose the occupation. It was not that the people lacked a national
identity as Mexicans, but local feelings were stronger and more persuasive.
In taking all of the above actions, Kearny was following a strategy which the U.S.
Secretary of War W. L. Marcy had suggested to General Taylor. Marcy wrote:
[A]mong the departments there are local antipathies and
dissensions. In all this field of division...there must be
openings to reach the interests, passions, or principles of some
of the parties, and thereby to conciliate their good will, and
make them co-operators with us in bringing about an honorable
and a speedy peace.81
The prevalence of localism—in particular, the significance of local societal relationships—
was apparent enough to the U.S. Secretary of War to serve as a basis of the strategy for the
war. He recognized “local antipathies and dissensions,” which could refer to both the conflict
between localism and centralism and to rivalries among the elite. Exploiting local
circumstances would assist in conquest.
Unfortunately for Santa Fe, Kearny and his men did not remain in the city for long.
Since the territory was “perfectly quiet” Kearny determined it was safe to move on to
California at the end of September.82 U.S. troops had occupied Monterey, California, since
July. Because the people of New Mexico seemed little disposed to violence, and because the
annexation of California was a primary goal of the War, Kearny felt comfortable leaving the
management of Santa Fe to lower-ranking officers so he could go and provide support in
California. Even his successor, Colonel Alexander Doniphan, left Santa Fe the following
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month to lead troops to Chihuahua. Doniphan appointed a volunteer colonel to serve as the
occupation’s commanding officer in his absence, a man named Sterling Price. Price had just
under 2,000 volunteer troops to manage. Volunteer troops were notoriously rowdy and
sometimes cruel. Occasionally an experienced professional officer could manage them, but
when the commander was a volunteer himself, it was a recipe for disaster. Price’s “slack
discipline resulted in disorderly troops, which increased [the] resentment [of] the local
citizens.”83 Mistreating the local community had the potential to turn peaceful citizens into
insurrectionists.
Nevertheless, some santafesinos not only continued to accept the occupation, but they
took their new allegiance to the United States very seriously. The most conspicuous example
of this was Donaciano Vigil. In December of 1846, Vigil heard from the owner of a local
gambling house that meetings against the U.S. occupation were taking place. Vigil had three
options: he could keep silent, he could offer to join the insurrection, or he could warn Price.
He chose the third option, confirming himself a traitor to Mexico. The leaders of the plot
were imprisoned. It was no wonder that Vigil did not elect the first course. As an officer in
the occupational government, he was in line to become one of the insurrection’s victims. But
why did he not choose to participate in the plot? What made his situation different from two
of the potential insurgency’s leaders, Tomás Ortiz or Diego Archuleta? Perhaps it was
because one of Vigil’s main excuses for cooperating with the United States—the
impracticality of fighting without sufficient resources—had not changed.
But there was another major difference between Vigil and the insurgents, and that
involved the local relationships and rivalries that often guided santafesinos’ choices. Charles
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Bent, the U.S.-appointed governor, was the rival of many of the insurgent leaders. Kearny
had “accidentally offended” many powerful nuevomexicanos by choosing Bent to replace
Vigil y Alarid.84 Vigil was not offended; not only did he have a place in the government but
he felt no personal hostility toward Bent. In contrast, Archuleta resented not receiving an
appointment in the occupational government and therefore had more reason to participate in
an insurrection.85 Local self-interests guided not only those who chose to cooperate, but also
those who chose not to.
Within the town of Santa Fe plans to revolt did not being in earnest until two very
local issues prompted them: the creation of an occupational government that excluded a
number of powerful local elites, and the absence of effective military discipline resulting in
the misconduct of U.S. soldiers. Local matters gave rise to insurrection; it was not that
suddenly the insurgents became more patriotic toward the Mexican nation. Local interests
once again aligned with national interests, making opposition to the U.S. occupation much
more appealing.
The Insurrection
There were no major battles fought by the main branch of U.S. troops under General
Zachary Taylor between September 1846 (the Battle of Monterrey in Nuevo Leon) and
February 1847 (the Battle of Buena Vista in Coahuila). Taylor's "reluctance to advance
deeper into Mexico" prompted President Polk to dispatch the U.S. navy to Veracruz to "open
a second front" for the main assault on Mexico.86 The Northeastern front was relatively quiet
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that autumn, but the winter of 1846-47 was much more eventful in the occupied territories of
New Mexico and California.
Although an insurrection within Santa Fe had been averted, other areas of New
Mexico eventually rose against the U.S. army’s presence in the territory. The most notable of
these uprisings took place in Taos, 70 miles north of Santa Fe. In January 1847, while
Governor Charles Bent was visiting his home in that city, insurrectionists attacked. They
scalped, killed, and decapitated him. This began an uprising which took the lives of 17
Anglo-Americans and nuevomexicano traitors and approximately 150 insurgents. As part of
the efforts to suppress this uprising, Colonel Price formed a battalion of Santa Fe residents to
go to Taos with U.S. soldiers. At least three of those who had been arrested for planning the
insurgency in Santa Fe “switched sides and helped suppress" the Taos rebellion.”87
The decision to switch sides, like so many other decisions among the elite, had to do
with personal interests and local rivalries. According to Donaciano Vigil, the local elite were
concerned with “losing their property,” and acted accordingly. Interestingly, he attributed the
Taos insurrection to the “influence” of priests on a “superstitious and fanatical people,”
because the priests “feared...with reason...that they would lose their privileges and power.”88
This gave the elite of New Mexico another local reason to dislike this particular insurrection.
They competed for influence not only among themselves but also with the priests. Those
who joined the U.S. army, including those who switched sides, did not like the direction the
insurrection was going in more ways than one: it was being guided by rival religious
authorities and it was threatening their personal property.
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One might wonder why Taos and its inhabitants reacted so differently from Santa Fe
during the U.S. occupation of New Mexico, since the two towns shared many of the same
characteristics; they were about the same size, they were centers of trade, and they were
borderland communities. In fact, it was the U.S. invaders' neglect of Taos’s local interests
which gave that city a stronger motivation to rebel. The occupational army focused on
creating allies among the merchants of Santa Fe, thereby neglecting the elites of Taos. Taos
was not completely overlooked, but the taoseños who had been invited to join the
occupational government (like Charles Bent) had powerful rivals. Eventually recognizing
the mistake they had made, the U.S. military would not prosecute the “strongmen who
fomented the rebellion,” and instead directed all the punishment at their followers.89 Local
leaders had to be appeased if they were to be persuaded to put an end to the rebellion. Once
the insurrection was suppressed, there remained a great distrust between the occupying army
and nuevomexicanos. As a result, all nuevomexicanos were disarmed. In Santa Fe there was
a “stubborn and sullen quiet which superior force alone compels.”90
Starting in March of 1847, U.S. troops under General Winfield Scott carved a path
toward Mexico City, a march that culminated in the occupation of the Mexican capital by
U.S. forces in September of that year. Nuevomexicanos were weeks behind in their receipt of
news from the center of the country. Nevertheless, fighting within New Mexico territory
would diminish over the same period, with the last major fight taking place in August. Also
in August, a “mass” of santafesinos and their fellow nuevomexicanos participated in the first
U.S. version of an election. They were to select the men who would serve as territorial
legislators.
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Donaciano Vigil succeeded Charles Bent as governor of New Mexico Territory, and
he used his position to appeal to the population's localism to encourage acceptance of the
new order. Throughout 1847, Donaciano Vigil would be “the critical collaborator” with the
U.S. invaders as he did his best to discourage resistance and promote “friendly relations.”91
He expanded the right to vote, so there was a larger “democratic base” than the people had
seen under Mexican law. He also worked hard to convince Price to resolve the most
common complaints of the populace; these complaints were predictably localized. For
example, he pointed out the need for regular soldiers to be stationed in Santa Fe instead of
volunteers, and he urged the discontinuance of martial law. Vigil knew that the treatment of
the citizens and the maintenance of order in the local community affected the people’s
decision-making and behavior. Vigil was essentially saying that removal of local
disturbances would ensure the cooperation of the population.
Near the end of the war, former governor Armijo wrote a letter to Vigil emphasizing
Vigil’s focus on the welfare of the local community. Having returned to his Albuquerque
home, Armijo thanked his “old friend” for the “good services he [had] lent [their] country.”
Given that Vigil had spent the last year cooperating with the United States, Armijo must have
been referring to the “country” (“paiz”) of Nuevo-Mexico. He attributed Vigil’s actions to
“humanity” and “philanthropy,” and commended him for taking care of “afflicted families”
like Armijo’s.92 Armijo recognized that Vigil was looking out for the local people. There
was more than one “country” to which a man could be loyal. Vigil was doing good work for
the territory of New Mexico, even if he was not necessarily doing good work for the Mexican
nation.
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By January 1848, when the newly elected territorial legislature met, it was clear that
the U.S.-Mexican War would soon be over and that New Mexico would belong to the United
States. The last notable battle had taken place in October 1847, and U.S. forces still
controlled Mexico City. In his address to the legislative body, Governor Vigil focused on
local issues. While this was not surprising in an address to a territorial legislature, it
provided interesting insights into the matters which were most important to the local
community. First, Vigil urged that any elected representatives should “have resided among
us for a sufficient time previous to their nomination” to allow them to understand the local
situation. This hearkened back to the longstanding objection to outsider appointees. They
now had an opportunity to remedy this problem. Vigil denied that this recommendation had
anything to do with “local spirit.” It was based on past experience, he said, with past
“administrations.” In other words, Vigil’s localistic attitude toward government was not
arbitrary or founded only on personal feelings and preferences; New Mexico's own history
proved localized leadership was the only means to preserve the “tranquility and security of
the country.” Vigil recounted some of the territory's history, beginning with the rebellion in
1837. He lamented that then-Governor Perez, in spite of “good intentions,” had committed
“errors” due to his “lack of knowledge of the character, interests, and traditional customs of
[the people] of New Mexico.”93 A person who was not thoroughly familiar with the local
community had no chance of successfully serving the populace.
The apparent success of this legislature had an impact on public opinion, particularly
due to the perceived benefits to the local community. The legislature would pass numerous
laws during its short session. Since nuevomexicano legislators were in the majority, they
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could ensure that nuevomexicano “interests [were] met in particular.”94 Even those who had
been strongly opposed to the U.S. occupation issued a statement praising the new local
government for its effectiveness. This statement mentioned two points in particular: it
commended the fact that local communities would better “‘enjoy the common resources of
the territory they inhabit’” (as opposed to losing many of them to the central government),
and it expressed gratitude that Native American aggressions had been quelled.95 Due to a
strong local sentiment, it was positive progress on these local matters which had persuasive
power.
The January legislature called for an annexation convention which would deliberate
making a formal request to the United States to accept New Mexico as a territory. Soon after
this, an anonymous Mexican elite outlined the local benefits of annexation and the negative
effects of a return to Mexican authority: “[e]xorbitant taxes,” a centralist governor who took
away local power, and a “label of traitor” for those who had any friendly dealings with the
occupying army or who had participated in the recent election. The writer acknowledged the
problems caused by the U.S. volunteer soldiers, but said that an effective government and
court system had been put into place in spite of that.96 This elite nuevomexicano appealed to
what he knew were the prevailing interests of the citizens: the local economy, local
autonomy, and local security. Also during this time, Armijo and Vigil exchanged letters
which repeatedly referred to New Mexico as their “native country.”97 Armijo and Vigil
strongly identified as nuevomexicanos. It was the land of their birth as much as the Mexican
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nation, and a land with which they had a more direct relationship. As they lost their identities
as “Mexicans” they were pleased to cling to their identity as nuevomexicanos.
The annexation convention included delegates both for and against annexation to the
United States, but those in favor were the strong majority. A resolution in favor of
annexation was passed. The convention met in February of 1848, a week after the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo was signed, though knowledge of the treaty did not arrive in Santa Fe
until mid-March.98 The ratification of the treaty by the U.S. Senate in March and the
Mexican Congress in May officially transferred Santa Fe to the United States.
Conclusion
It is not unusual for historians to take exception to Kearny’s claim that the U.S. army
conquered New Mexico without shedding any blood, given the insurrection of 1847 which
resulted in a number of deaths. Nevertheless, at the time Kearny made his statement, it was
accurate. The U.S. army marched into and occupied Santa Fe without firing a gun or killing
a citizen, and the santafesinos showed themselves inclined to peace. Although the emotions
expressed by santafesinos were “by turns cheery, sullen, resigned, and smolderingly
resentful,” it was not “violently resistant.”99 That is why Santa Fe is on the list of treason
towns.
The varying reactions to the U.S. occupation had a unifying theme: localism.
Santafesinos exhibited a localistic attitude. Their well-being was directly tied to the wellbeing of the local community, so naturally the local community was their primary concern.
They may have disagreed among themselves as to what was best for Santa Fe, but they all
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agreed that Santa Fe and New Mexico were the priority. The interests of national patriotism
and pride were secondary to territorial and municipal patriotism and pride.
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Chapter 3
La Paz, Baja California
Over the last two centuries historians and observers have used similar words to
describe the territory of Baja California: "barren," "backwater," "rugged," "forbidding," and
"unattractive." Upon arriving on its shores in 1846, many U.S. soldiers agreed with this
description, but some did not. Twenty-five year old New Yorker, Edward Gould Buffum,
wrote that La Paz was "the prettiest town [he] had...seen in California." Another soldier,
William Redmond Ryan, declared La Paz to be "of great extent and beauty." So what made
La Paz appealing to men like Buffum and Ryan, in spite of its rugged and forbidding nature?
Besides being located near an excellent harbor with an abundance of fish, the main streets of
La Paz were lined with willow trees providing "delicious shade." Palm and fruit trees lined
the beach and there was a quantity of tropical fruit. Cactus, large and small, added to the
"novelty of the scene" for New Yorkers like Ryan and Buffum. The two soldiers also
described rows of adobe houses painted white, with roofs of thatched palm leaves and oyster
shells. Although most dwellings had only one room and mud floors, the wealthier citizens
built multiple stories alongside pleasant gardens and vineyards. This small community of
approximately 1,500-2,000 faced invasion and occupation by the United States in 1846.100
As in Santa Fe, the local leaders elected to cooperate with the invaders, and many paceños
followed suit. The reasons which prompted them to do so stemmed primarily from localism.
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Like Santa Fe, localism in La Paz was rooted in its unique history and characteristics.
This localism is evident in the writings of observers and paceños. In particular, government
neglect, minimal immigration, a seaside location and maritime economy, demographics, and
even religious characteristics contributed to a localistic attitude and culture that would
influence the people’s decisions during the U.S.-Mexican War.
The Community
There was a pattern of failed Spanish settlement all over the Baja California peninsula
until 1697 when the Jesuits took charge of the process. The settlement of La Paz was no
exception. Before the arrival of the Spanish, native tribes such as the Pericú, the Cora, the
Aripe, and the Guaicura competed over access to the area due to the bounteous harbor and
the availability of fresh water. In a peninsula where water, vegetation, and game animals
were not abundant, access to freshwater and good fishing grounds was greatly prized. The
Spaniards landed in La Paz early in their exploration of the New World, but attempts to
create a permanent presence failed time after time due to opposition from the native
population and an insufficient water supply for the agricultural lifestyle the Spaniards
desired. Once religious orders took over the settlement of the peninsula, the only support
bajacalifornios received from the Spanish government was a few soldiers for protection.
This set a standard of Mexico City ignoring Baja California, a standard that did not change
when Mexico won its independence from Spain.101
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This was not just a matter of carelessness on the part of either Mexico or Spain. It
can certainly be argued that places like Baja California were less of a priority, but they might
have been a bigger priority had there not been so many obstacles preventing the
implementation of effective, direct national authority. Besides the financial struggles which
plagued Mexico, communication was hindered by distance and the arduousness of travel.
There was also the matter of the strikingly different environment that existed in Baja
California when compared to Mexico City. Mexico City was not a port town, nor was it a
desert (it is considered sub-tropical). How were the nation's officials supposed to understand
the needs of a people living in an environment that was completely unfamiliar to them?
Perhaps the most significant impediment, however, was Mexico’s inability to promote
settlement in places like Baja California, and the related difficulty of finding government
officials willing to serve there. This resulted in a population born and raised on the peninsula
with little personal knowledge of or contact with the rest of the country. Those few recent
immigrants to the peninsula came with a strong motivation to advance the local community
in order to make their relocation a success.
Besides creating a highly isolated population with limited contacts outside the local
community, the writings of Baja California’s governor showed that the neglect of the
Mexican central government encouraged the people to focus on local matters. The territorial
governor at the time of the invasion was Francisco Palacios Miranda. When Palacios
Miranda was appointed the governor of Baja California in 1844, he had his work cut out for
him; he was the third governor of the territory in as many years. Born in the Canary Islands
in 1790, he migrated to Mexico in 1809 and fought for Mexican Independence. Eventually
in the Rio de la Plata Region and on the Northern Frontier of New Spain (Scottsdale: Pentacle
Press, 2005), 47.
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he received the rank of colonel in the Mexican army. By the time the U.S. navy appeared in
La Paz harbor, Palacios Miranda was in his fifties, and he had become "terribly embittered"
toward the Mexican government. He complained that the peninsula had been “abandoned”
by Mexico.102 It had been two years since he or any other leader in the territory had received
an official communication from the central government, making it “two years since Baja
California has managed for itself alone.”103 This was one of several complaints the governor
sent in a letter to a U.S. commander. The letter’s purpose was to expound Palacios Miranda’s
reasons for submitting to the U.S. occupation without a fight. The essential theme was that
since Mexico had left the peninsula to fend for itself, the peninsula would do just that. Local
circumstances would dictate their actions, not loyalty to a government that had neglected
them. No doubt Palacios Miranda would have agreed with a Mexican liberal treatise that
stated that a people who would “sacrifice[] themselves in defense of an order representing
nothing but ruin and misery...would richly deserve the ridicule directed against them.”104 Ties
to the national government that might have been fostered by communication and gratitude
were practically non-existent; therefore the ties to the local community became that much
stronger. The “order” that aided survival or prosperity was the one deserving the most
consideration, and for paceños, that “order” was the municipality and the region.105
One U.S. soldier observed that government neglect caused the paceños to “assume[] a
sort of independence of thought and action.”106 This independence did not mean that they no
longer considered themselves Mexicans; it meant their thoughts and actions were not dictated
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by the expectations of the national government. María Amparo Ruiz was a young paceña at
the time of the U.S. occupation. Ruiz was the younger daughter in an elite family who
supported the U.S. occupation. Ruiz’s writings in later life provide insights into why they
might have done so. Localism was prominent among them, especially the identification and
preoccupation with local societal relationships. Although the family was not wealthy, they
were still numbered among the elite due to "political recognition," influence, and land
ownership. Contemporaries described María Amparo Ruiz as very beautiful, with an
"aristocratic air." She also proved to be highly intelligent, observant, and ambitious. She
eventually fell in love with one of the U.S. commanders who oversaw the occupation of La
Paz.107 Ruiz’s letters showed that she conceived her “patria” to be California more than
Mexico.108 Also evident in Ruiz’s writings was the “bitter resentment” against the Mexican
government for its neglect. This resentment was later transferred to the United States when
that country's leadership also failed to show proper “sympathies” for californios.109 It was
difficult to love someone or something neglectful or unknown. So long as the local
community proved more immediately connected to the health and well-being of its people, it
was the local community that received the most loyalty.
Ruiz would later become a novelist, and the heroes and heroines of her novels (many
of them born in Mexico) portrayed localistic attitudes. For example, in The Squatter and the
Don, Don Mariano Alamar criticizes an American from the southern United States for
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“deceiv[ing]” his fellow Southerners: “If he had been sent to deceive the North...the errand
would have been—if not more honorable—at least less odious…, not so treacherous."110 As
narrator, Ruiz left no doubt which characters she sympathized with and which she did not.
The Don represented enlightenment, reason and understanding. Although the novel takes
place in the United States, the issues the characters face are universal. When Ruiz criticized
the actions of U.S. citizens through Alamar, she was no hypocrite: the citizen of any nation
who behaved in the same way merited the same disapproval. Don Alamar sees the Southern
States as a neglected region after the Civil War. In his view, a man’s interests are or should
be tied to the region whence he comes. Bajacalifornios were well aware that what was best
for their neglected region was not necessarily what was best for other parts of Mexico.
Nevertheless, a person’s loyalty was logically tied to his or her region. Ignoring the wellbeing of one’s local community was “odious” and even “treacherous.”
La Paz's shoreline position affected security and fostered a preoccupation with local
security. First, it created a certain vulnerability which the Mexican government was unable
to remedy, once again forcing the local community to look out for itself. The situation was
similar to Santa Fe’s experience with Native Americans. Mexico in the mid-nineteenth
century did not have an “effective naval force.”111 There were less than twelve small ships
guarding over 8,000 miles of shoreline. Since the local community could not rely on the
national government for protection, any assistance had to come from other Mexican states
across the Sea of Cortez. However, these states had their own interests and their own borders
to protect, so in time of war La Paz could only count on what those states were willing to
spare. After the war, paceños would complain about this vulnerability, declaring their
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intention to leave Mexico and join themselves to a “maritime power” like the United States
or England.112 Protection of the local community from attack was more important than
remaining loyal to a nation which provided no protection. Preservation of the local
community was paramount.
As a port of trade, La Paz’s economy was dependent on other Mexican communities.
Not only did it need buyers for its goods, but it relied on its fellow Mexican states for
supplies. One might expect this to create strong ties to the Mexican nation, but it did not.
Because maritime trade was so crucial to the local economy, paceños had cause to resent the
central government. While the scarcity of water made food production in Baja California
difficult, it was not impossible. The territory managed to produce goods for export such as
dates, figs, grapes, lemons, olives, wine, beef, soap, cheese, maize, and pearls. U.S.
observers and Mexican liberals noted the negative local effects caused by the state of
Mexican trade. According to one Mexican treatise, trade was "variable" due to "an irregular
and fluctuating tariff, which differs for each port and changes with every change
of...administration.”113 They were "confined to a coasting trade with the ports of Mexico,"
and interstate tariffs hindered trade even with these communities.114 High tariffs and
“countless” regulations on foreign trade prevented paceños from receiving imports from
outside of Mexico without resorting to deals with merchants who “flouted the law.”115
María Amparo Ruiz’s novels reflected the tension that could exist between local and
national economic interests. In The Squatter and the Don, the characters fight for their small
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town, San Diego, to become the terminus for a transcontinental railroad. San Diego is
economically neglected by the national government and businessmen because it is considered
“a most arid luckless region, where it never rains.”116 (This description is quite similar to
outsider descriptions of Baja California.) In the book, Ruiz condemned U.S. legislators for
this neglect and the resulting stagnation of San Diego’s economy.117 A government that did
not foster the local economy forfeited respect. A government that actively harmed the local
economy was worthy of contempt. Beyond this, the characters show a strong devotion to
their municipality and a belief that their economic well-being resides with the prosperity of
the city, not the state or the nation. Without the immediate development which a railroad
would offer the town, one character laments, “Our merchants, our farmers, all, the entire
county will suffer great distress or ruin….”118 Paceños relied on local development and the
prosperity in the city where they invested their money and built their homes. That was where
their hopes lay. The prosperity of the nation in general was not enough; there was no
guarantee it would trickle down to their benefit.
As in Santa Fe, local autonomy was important to the people. Being limited in their
trade made paceños subject to the interests of the states on which they depended. Elite
bajacalifornios expressed their disgust when leaders in Sonora took it upon themselves to
appoint a leader for the territory both during and after the U.S.-Mexican War.119 This
followed a long-standing pattern observed by Governor Palacios Miranda that
bajacalifornios were forced to “deliver themselves with full trust into the hands of leaders”
they had not chosen for themselves.120 Outsiders had agendas and goals which might or
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might not benefit the local community. As localists, paceños assumed those with strong ties
to the municipality or the territory could provide the best leadership. Any perceived harm
caused by a leader appointed by Mexico City or another state only served to strengthen this
belief. María Amparo Ruiz commented on the tendency of outsider leaders to neglect local
needs: “Congressmen know that they are expected to watch the materials interests of their
States or counties, but they do not feel any moral responsibility to see that other
constituencies do not suffer injustice.”121 In other words leaders looked out for those who
appointed them. If a local community did not appoint or remove their leaders, those leaders
had no motivation to cater to local wants or needs. Hence the strong desire for local
autonomy.
While demographics do not necessarily cause localism, they can be relevant, and they
certainly were in La Paz. The residents of La Paz were mostly Spaniards, creoles, mestizos,
and a few foreigners. Tribal identities native to the area were essentially extinct due to
epidemics or absorption into other populations. As in most parts of Mexico, Spaniards and
creoles were more likely to be affluent and to hold positions of power in the town, and they
often identified as white.122 The lower class was predominantly mestizo. However, unlike
Santa Fe, it was the upper classes in La Paz who were most friendly to the invaders. The
paceño elite did not feel as threatened as the santafesino elite when it came to their influence
over the populace. In part this was because their influence was not of the same kind:
caudilloism was not a feature of La Paz society. Furthermore, the creoles and Spaniards felt
more racial ties to those of European descent than they did to those with Native American
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blood. This feeling was not limited to La Paz, but lacking the strong demarcations created by
a caudillo society, the paceño elite were more susceptible to outsiders classing them with the
mestizo population; consequently, they needed to assert their European ancestry with more
urgency. Once again María Amparo Ruiz’s novels provide evidence of this state of mind.
One of several trials which the Mexican-born heroes and heroines must overcome in her
novels is being mistaken for Indian, Black, or mixed race: Lola, in Who Would Have Thought
It?, “was crimson with shame and resentment” when one of her guardians refused to
recognize that she was a pure-blooded Spaniard, not mestizo.123 In The Squatter and the Don,
Don Mariano Alamar calls himself a Spaniard, although he was born in Mexico.124 This
tendency to identify more closely with literal blood descent as opposed to nation of birth was
simply one less tie to the national community and one more tie to local and personal
interests.125
The Catholic religion of La Paz was similar to that of Santa Fe, with a shortage of
priests and frontier variations in practice and doctrine. A story from one U.S. soldier
exemplified the tendency of frontier priests to adjust policy and practice to fit the local
situation. In the absence of another easy option, one Padre asked a U.S. soldier to serve as a
godfather for a baby he was baptizing, although the soldier was a Protestant.126 There were
two priests who had residence or influence in La Paz, and they both proved that the local
concerns of religious leaders could eclipse the national. The padre presidente of the
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peninsula, Padre Ignacio Ramírez y Arollona, was among those who chose to be openly
friendly with the U.S. army.127 Captain DuPont of the U.S. navy stated that he was simply a
man “who can understand the propriety of yielding to circumstances.”128 In other words, he
was practical. He had looked at the situation and determined that local conditions warranted
neutrality. Another influential priest did not support the occupation, although he initially
pretended to do so. U.S. soldiers did not know what to make of Padre Gabriel González.
They marveled that he openly violated of his vows of chastity by living with a woman and
having several children.129 They wondered at his being an "inveterate gambler."130 One U.S.
captain decided that “he [was] the most shrewd and cunning man in Lower California, as
well as the most dissolute.”131 Although Padre González was not a resident of La Paz (he
hailed from Todos Santos and Loreto), he traveled to the capital regularly.132 Setting aside
any debate whether Padre González had legitimate concerns about the spiritual welfare of the
people, there is evidence his actions were motivated by a desire to preserve his local
influence and property. This was a common criticism Mexican liberals advanced against
priests during the war. They complained that priests acted in their own self-interest instead
of considering the interests of the nation, accused priests of being more worried about
preserving their “unique and absolute power” over the populace and defending “their own
property.”133 Given that Padre González supported an insurrection only until his property
was put in jeopardy by the action (as will be seen below), such observations should not be
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dismissed as baseless. Like other citizens, priests had their own interests to consider. These
localized concerns could carry as much weight with them as their religion, and they almost
certainly carried more weight than a need to fight on behalf of the Mexican national
government or on behalf of the Catholic Church. The independence of frontier priests from
constant oversight only increased this tendency.134
The U.S. Invasion
The features of the local community and the localism they inspired were clearly
evident in the paceños’ response to the U.S. occupation. The invasion of Baja California
took place a few weeks after the invasion of New Mexico; unlike Santa Fe, the invasion
required a naval force. Indeed, the invasion of Baja California provides a glimpse into U.S.
naval history. On August 17, 1846, U.S. Commodore Robert F. Stockton issued a
proclamation from Los Angeles, Alta California, claiming both upper and lower California as
a territory of the United States by conquest. A month later, military boats appeared in the
Bay of La Paz. They were carrying a message from the Cyane, a U.S. ship anchored
approximately six miles away. The ship's captain, Samuel F. DuPont, sent the following
demands to Governor Palacios Miranda: (1) the population of Baja California was to cease
commerce with Mexico, (2) the people must agree to remain neutral in the war, and (3) all
local vessels needed to be turned over as prizes. Governor Palacios Miranda traveled to the
Cyane the next morning to make terms with Captain DuPont. He had received no
communications from the Mexican central government regarding the invasion, and there was
no evidence that military aid would be forthcoming.135
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Palacios Miranda’s words and actions during this time reflect a localistic attitude. For
example, he and his fellow municipal leaders expressed “disappointment all around that
[Lower California] had not been included in the proclamation[s]” issued in Upper
California.136 Lower California had certainly been mentioned in these proclamations, but
only as an appendage of Alta California. This offended local pride. Baja California had been
lumped together with a neighboring territory to the north, when naturally they saw
themselves as distinct and independent. Conquering one was not conquering the other, and
Baja California expected to be recognized as the separate locality that it was. Further
evidence of the predominance of local concerns could be seen in Palacios Miranda's offer to
“assume the safekeeping” of nine local vessels that the Cyane had claimed as prizes of war.137
DuPont did not have the means to keep and protect the vessels at the time, so if Palacios
Miranda had not offered to do this, the U.S. commander would have been obliged to burn
them. These vessels were crucial to the local economy. Rather than have them destroyed,
Palacios Miranda was willing to keep and protect them on the enemy’s behalf.138
As someone with military experience, Palacios Miranda was keenly aware that La Paz
and Baja California lacked the military supplies necessary to battle the U.S. forces with any
hope of success. La Paz’s vulnerability to attack from the sea made prioritizing the local
community a necessity. By September 1846 there had been two major battles between
Mexico and the United States, one at Palo Alto and the other at Resaca de Palma. The
casualties on the Mexican side far outweighed those of the United States: 400 to 55 in one
and 700 to 121 in the other. The battles also resulted in the occupation of the city of
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Matamoros, where the "inhabitants were treated roughly by the U.S. army."139 The rough
treatment was presumably made worse because the locals had put up a fight. If Mexicans
were at a disadvantage even on the mainland, how could Baja California hope to do any
better? Palacios Miranda bluntly explained that his willingness to submit to the Cyane was
inspired by the fact that the territory had few "supplies and munitions" and no "military and
naval resources."140 Local circumstances advised neutrality. The local situation guided his
choices, even if it made him a traitor in the eyes of the national community.
During the two weeks after Palacios Miranda met with Captain DuPont, the Cyane
remained in and around La Paz. DuPont made contact with foreign residents of the city. He
noted that while they were not friendly to the United States, they were very concerned about
their property. Personal feelings were not as important as the well-being of the local
community. As for Mexican-born paceños, DuPont expressed appreciation for and approval
of the treatment he and his men received from them. The people willingly resupplied the
Cyane, even providing "fresh bread" for the sailors. DuPont noted in his records that the
"'neglect'" of the Mexican government and local poverty made paceños more willing to
cooperate.141 The safety and well-being of the local community was the priority. Both of
these were better assured by being friendly with the U.S. invaders. DuPont was not ignorant
of the role fear played in the decision-making of the paceños. What mattered was what
people feared most and what was most important to them. At this point their lives did not
depend on actively or willingly assisting the U.S. navy, but only on not taking up arms. The
sailors could have commandeered what they needed without loss of life. Nevertheless,
citizens showed themselves disposed to help the sailors without offering even passive
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resistance. Based on DuPont’s observations, this was because of the Mexican government’s
failure to protect and prosper the local community. Recognizing this, DuPont and subsequent
U.S. commanders urged the necessity of promoting the local economy in order to maintain
the support of the city. “[I]f anything could rouse [the paceños] to levé en masse” in spite of
their initial willingness to cooperate, it would be interfering with local trade, one commander
warned.142 If the U.S. conquest benefited the local economy, or at the very least did not make
it worse, the people were much more likely to remain neutral.
On September 28th, DuPont and the Cyane departed, leaving "only a small force" of
U.S. soldiers in the city. Palacios Miranda's words and actions convinced DuPont that he
only needed to leave a few men behind. However, the governor’s cooperation alone would
not have been enough to satisfy Captain DuPont. The U.S. commander had been convinced
by the "friendliness and cooperation" of the citizens in general. Nevertheless, La Paz’s quick
and easy cooperation did not sit well with everyone in the city or on the peninsula. A group
of paceños asked the governor "to convene a junta" to determine a course of action after the
majority of the U.S. forces had departed. Palacios Miranda agreed to do so, although in the
eyes of the U.S. navy this violated his agreement to avoid “indirectly ... countenanc[ing] ...
others in resisting or opposing the authorities of the United States.”143 In February 1847,
representatives from various locales in Baja California met near San José del Cabo. Palacios
Miranda may or may not have attended the council, but he certainly had enemies among the
representatives. These representatives took the opportunity to label him a traitor, remove him
from office, and appoint another political leader in his stead. The council’s vote to remove
Palacios Miranda from office had no practical effect in La Paz. The U.S. army continued to
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treat Palacios Miranda as the Mexican leader in Baja California, and in La Paz he still "held
sway,” meaning paceños in general were willing to follow his lead.144
Why did some individuals and communities react differently from Palacios Miranda
and the paceños? Did they feel more loyalty to the nation? Those who actively opposed the
U.S. invasion certainly made expressions of patriotism. The self-appointed commander of
the town of Guaymas told DuPont that “no hostilities would be undertaken” there, but neither
would he cooperate the way Palacios Miranda had done because it would be an offense to
“national and military honor.”145
Without entirely discounting patriotism as a motivation, it is important to consider
other possible reasons some on the peninsula refused to follow La Paz’s lead. Local
interests, both communal and personal, were certainly among them. One Mexican treatise
observed the role of personal “honor” in driving Mexicans to fight, as opposed to any desire
to defend the national government.146 A person does not need to feel any real pride in or
loyalty to one’s nation in order to feel bound to fight for it. It can simply be a matter of duty.
Furthermore, honor can have a selfish side. Captain DuPont believed that men like the
commander in Guaymas were motivated by ambition for glory more than by duty: a Mexican
could “gain[] a little fame for himself...by making” at least “a show of resistance” (emphasis
in original).147 Foreign residents in La Paz and a contemporary Mexican political treatise
expressed similar beliefs.148 The treatise complained that every revolution in Mexico gave
individuals the opportunity for promotion.149 The national government had long been
144
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“besieged” by “obscure men alleging to have contributed important services...in the cause of
the nation” who requested as “compensation” a “high military post[].”150 Such remarks
proved that there were doubts even among Mexicans regarding appeals to patriotism or
honor. They argued that these men and women were motivated as much by personal and
local interests as the traitors were. The difference revolved around alternate perceptions
about what was best for the local community and which local or personal interests should
have priority.
In the middle of April 1847, two months after the junta that removed Palacios
Miranda as governor, another U.S. vessel made its appearance in the harbor of La Paz. This
time it was the Portsmouth, under the command of John B. Montgomery. Captain
Montgomery immediately dispatched a messenger to Palacios Miranda. He informed the
governor that he was under orders to “hoist and protect” the U.S. flag in La Paz. In order to
do so “peaceably,” he demanded Palacios Miranda and the citizens “surrender the town...with
all public Mexican property [and] arms and munitions of war.” Before responding to these
orders, Palacios Miranda conferred with a "territorial deputation" and within a day the
deputation sent word to the Portsmouth. Included in the message was the following
statement:
...without prejudice you can proceed...to hoist the American
flag in this town, in respect to which, neither in it nor in the
whole territory are to be found resources to oppose this
measure; it is reserved to propose to you additional
conditions...in favor of the interests, peace, and well being of
the peninsula.151
This message demonstrated that the deputation was guided by localism. First of all, the local
situation guided them: the lack of “resources to oppose this measure” made compliance the
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only reasonable choice. Second of all, the deputation insisted on acting “in favor of the
interests, peace, and well being of the peninsula.”152 Their primary interest was in ensuring
the best results for the territory, not the nation.
Ninety U.S. soldier-seamen disembarked in La Paz for the flag ceremony, and the
citizens of La Paz gathered in the plaza to hear a proclamation explaining what would be
expected of them. Several statements in this proclamation reflected the U.S. commander’s
recognition that the well-being of the local community was the predominant concern among
paceños. The primary theme of the proclamation was that the people were advised to
“continue peaceable and quiet, pursuing their usual business.”153 In other words,
Montgomery urged paceños to keep the local community running as it had always done. He
knew that the best way to encourage cooperation was to minimize local disruption.
A comparison between the proclamations issued in Santa Fe and La Paz shows that
although the future of the local community was important to both peoples, they were given
different expectations. The Santa Fe proclamation issued in August 1846 told santafesinos
that the United States now “claim[ed] [them] as citizens” of that country, and intended to
“provide...a free government...similar to those in the United States.” In contrast, the La Paz
proclamation issued six months later informed paceños that they must wait to learn their
“future political relations” from the treaty of peace.154 At this point, paceños were not
necessarily relying on the promise of annexation to the United States. U.S. soldier Henry
Halleck noted in his records that it was doubtful the majority of paceños intended to
renounce Mexico entirely, in spite of the government’s neglect. Instead, he observed a
feeling among them "that nothing they could do would have the least influence upon the
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result" of the war, so preserving the local community was the priority.155 Halleck’s words
implied his assumption that if the people believed the fate of the local community was truly
tied to the fate of the nation, they might have behaved differently. But since the people
assumed the outcome for Mexico would be the same regardless of what they chose to do,
there was no reason to destroy the local community on the nation’s behalf.
After the flag ceremony and proclamation, most soldiers returned to the ship. Due to
the “peaceable disposition...of the authorities and of the people,” only a "guard of marines"
remained to protect the flag.156 Three commissioners appointed by Palacios Miranda then
met with U.S. officers in the governor’s home. In exchange for complying with U.S.
demands for neutrality, the citizens of La Paz received the following concessions: those who
made up the "municipal body" could retain their offices and take over many of the governor’s
"functions;" private property and civil and religious liberty would "be respected;" the citizens
of Baja California would have the "same rights and privileges" of U.S. citizens; and any
vessels which the U.S. previously confiscated would be returned to their owners, allowing
commerce to continue.157
Every one of these assurances related to localism. First, Palacios Miranda’s post as
governor was abolished, a post that was actually a central government appointment. Instead,
his duties would belong to city leaders, because local leadership was important. Second, if
local lives, property and privileges were not preserved, there would have been no benefit to
paceños in submitting to the U.S. occupation. Finally, the local economy needed to be
protected; ensuring the continuance of trade was necessary to enforce the people’s
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cooperation. Local concerns prompted La Paz’s compliance in the first place, so of course
paceños required the U.S. commander’s promise to respect them.
Less than two weeks after the articles of capitulation were signed, the Portsmouth left
La Paz's waters. The captain, under orders to depart, recognized that the absence of a naval
presence in the bay could be dangerous for the citizens of La Paz. He wrote to his
commander, Commodore William B. Shubrick, that there were "'apprehensions'" among
"'many people...that ill-disposed persons...may take advantage of the absence of all force, and
visit them with resentment for their recent quiet submission to the United States
authorities.'"158 The La Paz junta specifically requested "'a vessel to be placed'" in the Bay of
La Paz—even a small one of 10-12 men—to "secure quietude to the community."159 Until
and unless this was done, the municipal authorities were "afraid to do anything."160 The
people of La Paz knew very well that although their cooperation might save them from
violence from the U.S. side, it invited violence on another. They had reason to fear for their
lives either way, indicating that it was more than just fear that guided their decision-making.
It was a decision that surrender was better for local interests, property and economy.
It would take three months, but the junta's request was eventually granted. At the end
of July 1847, the Lexington arrived in La Paz carrying two companies of New York
volunteers (115 soldiers) under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Henry Stanton Burton.
For approximately two months, Burton and his men "quietly occupied" the town. During this
quiet occupation Burton came into contact with fifteen-year-old María Amparo Ruiz, the
future novelist. The two would eventually marry.
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Ruiz was not the only paceña who chose to be friendly to the New York volunteers
stationed in La Paz; many women who were motivated by a concern for the well-being of the
local community made themselves amiable to the occupying army. One U.S. soldier
blissfully recounted the nights he and a his fellows spent under a "tamarind tree...listen[ing]
to songs in...enchanting Spanish, sung by a beautiful creature who had undertaken the task of
teaching...her language." This was followed by a "ramble" upon the beach or "a dance upon
a greensward."161 Both Mexican and U.S. sources describe multiple instances in which
women in Mexico "formed lasting attachments with American soldiers."162 Of course, shortterm attachments were more typical. While some Mexican women like Ruiz actually fell in
love, for most women the motivations related to local or personal interests. Even among
those who fell in love, other interests could be at play, like ambition. Ruiz "had an overriding
sense...that she was destined for something bigger than the village of La Paz;" her marriage
to Burton gave her opportunities she never could have had if she married a fellow
bajacalifornio.163 Although in one way this might be perceived as a betrayal of the local
community—a desire to leave—it was simply another manifestation of the role of personal
desires and feelings. One might call these the most “local” concerns of all. Elsewhere in the
Mexico, soldiers noted that the women were interested in seeking to profit off the invaders,
and that women recognized their amiability resulted in better treatment of the town as a
whole.164 No doubt the women of Baja California had similar motives. The local economy
and local interests were better served by friendliness than by scorn.
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As in Santa Fe, Mexican reactions to and perceptions of the occupation were guided
by the occupying army’s interactions with the local community. Anglos who recognized
Hispanics as fellow human beings, equally capable of civilization and intellectual pursuits,
could easily mix and form fulfilling friendships and relationships.165 As long as paceños
were treated fairly by the occupying army, a congenial relationship was relatively easy to
maintain. People like Ruiz and her family saw no betrayal in forming friendly relationships
with those who offered no personal offense. La Paz may have had a more luck than Santa Fe
in maintaining cordial relations between soldiers and citizens. Although Lt. Col. Burton
reported that the volunteer troops were difficult to handle, the Lower California assembly
praised him and other officers for their conduct during the occupation. They noted the "good
and refined feelings" which "actuated" Burton's superior, and told Burton, "[Y]ou...have
made yourself the idol of all the country, your courage, prudence and humanity are qualities
which the enemy itself cannot forget." Apparently, Burton did his best to apprehend and
punish anyone who offended the locals.166
The Insurrection
Some time during the relatively uneventful months of occupation, Burton received
word that insurrection was brewing in some villages on the peninsula.167 The towns of
Comondú and Mulegé (north of La Paz) were particularly active. Insurgents there received
aid from the states of Sonora and Sinaloa in the form of weapons and leadership. At the
behest of those states’ leaders, Manuel Pineda, a captain in the Mexican army, traveled to
165
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Baja California to provide military command.168 Insurgent political authority was in the
hands of Mauricio Castro, appointed to replace Palacios Miranda by the junta of San José del
Cabo.
Captain DuPont could find “no motives of patriotism” among the majority of the
insurrection leaders.169 By proclamation he accused insurgents of working “under the plea of
patriotic motives,” when in reality they only had “a view...to take advantage of a state of
misrule and disorder, to plunder their more peaceable fellow citizens.”170 DuPont was
essentially accusing them of having local, personal reasons for rebelling against U.S.
authority. They simply had differing local interests than those who submitted to the U.S.
invasion. Elite paceños also doubted the motives of the insurrectionists; they believed the
insurgency was instigated by Sinaloa and Sonora “prompted by party spirit and their own
interests.”171 They had offered no assistance when the U.S. first arrived in Baja California.
Sinaloa and Sonora were the primary trade partners of Baja California. They must have
realized it was in their own interests to reopen the ports of that territory to their merchants. It
is unclear whether this was in fact the primary cause of their interference, but certainly the
paceños believed it was. They resented interference in their local autonomy whether it came
from the central government or another state. They assumed other states were as concerned
about their own local matters as the people of La Paz.
Since Burton was under orders not to leave the capital, all he could do upon receiving
news of the rising insurrection was bide his time. However, at the end of September, the
arrival of the U.S.S. Dale gave him options. Burton sent the Dale to Mulegé in the hopes of
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cutting off communications between Baja California and the Mexican mainland, thereby
blocking the arrival of additional military arms. The Dale failed in its mission. Although it
drove the insurgents from the city, it did not remain to occupy it, and it could not manage an
effective blockade. The next day, an American resident of La Paz chartered his schooner (the
Libertad) to the U.S. military. For the next month this vessel battled the insurgency near
Mulegé. The capacity for destroying the town was limited, for the schooner lacked the
weaponry of larger vessels.
Insurrection leader Captain Pineda lacked the localism that played such a large role
in the decisions of community leaders like those in La Paz. The local municipal leader of
Mulegé, Alcalde Tomás Zuniga, lacked the ability to act on behalf of the local community.
U.S. leaders recognized him as the local leader and consequently sought to negotiate through
him. He responded that “the powers of his office had been superseded by the presence of the
commandant general,” Pineda; in turn Pineda sent word to the U.S. naval commander that the
local leaders no longer had any power, because the city was “held by the Mexican force.”172
Pineda’s confirmation of the loss of local authority confirmed that Zuniga was not simply
seeking to deflect blame. Pineda had no ties to the community of Mulegé. He was working
on behalf of other states. Had his primary concern been the fate of Mulegé he might have
acted differently.173
The insurrection found little support among paceños. Other communities wavered in
their support or opposition, as the threat to the well-being of a local community increased or
decreased. Furthermore, it was the smallest towns of the peninsula that became the
headquarters for the insurrection. In the absence of a strong U.S. force, insurgents moved in
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to an area. But, as Captain DuPont observed, the insurgents “never will come where there is
a ship.”174 The people were not looking for a fight they could not win. They wanted to put
on a show of opposition. Was this because the insurgents lacked the localism of their
neighbors? Did they think more nationally? Most observers doubted this. Their motives
were variously identified as spiritual (a defense of the Catholic religion) or personal (a desire
for glory or property). In spite of boasts that the people would fight to the “last drop of
blood,” these were not warriors seeking to force a battle against an invincible foe merely to
prove their loyalty to Mexico.175 These were men carefully calculating what they could and
could not get away with, looking to recover local autonomy from the U.S. military.176
A novel by Ruiz satirized calls to sacrifice local and personal interests for patriotism,
demonstrating her belief that they could easily be employed by men who were only looking
out for themselves. In a novel set during the U.S. Civil War, the brother of a character named
Lavinia is kept a prisoner of war. A personal rivalry with a powerful legislator prevents his
being exchanged with other prisoners. Of course, the individual to whom Lavinia appeals for
help does not admit this is the reason. Instead, he claims her family has been called upon to
show its patriotism: “So you see how, like a patriotic girl as you are, you should resign
yourself to the misfortune that made your brother one of the noble victims selected by
Providence to be the means of subjugating” the enemy.177 Individuals like Ruiz and her
family saw no reason to “resign” themselves to being “noble victims” for the sake of
patriotism, especially when they did not think patriotism required it. They were “patriotic” to
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the community which they deemed their “patria” (Baja California), and in their minds
neutrality was local patriotism.
The month of November 1847 was a difficult one in La Paz. By this time Mexico
City had been occupied by General Scott's army and negotiations were underway. Whether
this news had reached Baja California or not, paceños had cause to fear the insurgents as
much as the U.S. army; they felt "restrained by prudential motives" from formally declaring
in favor of one side or the other. However, Commodore William Branford Shubrick
believed that a number of bajacalifornios would volunteer to assist the U.S. side if they felt
assured that "they were never to return to the rule of Mexico.”178 This belief caused Shubrick
to issue a proclamation that “invite[d] the well-disposed to stand fast in their fidelity,” and
declared that “'[n]o contingency can be foreseen in which the United States will ever
surrender or relinquish their possession of the Californias.'”179 Some paceños took courage in
these words, as Shubrick intended. Shubrick gained more overt support by assuring the
locals that the fate of their local community was in the hands of the United States, not
Mexico.
By making local interests coincide with U.S. interests, some paceños became willing
to actively fight on the side of the United States, switching from accommodationists to actual
traitors. As the capital and the headquarters of the U.S. occupation of Baja California, La Paz
naturally became the target of the insurgents. Burton and his 112 men prepared for a fight.
Most paceños evacuated, clinging to neutrality, but there were "many women and children...
[who took] refuge on board" boats in the harbor. At least 29 citizens remained to actively
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assist in the city's defense; they were led by former governor Palacios Miranda. The women
and children who hid on the boats were probably those uncomfortable with the idea of living
in the open desert, or relatives of the twenty-nine paceños who volunteered to help the U.S.
army. The paceños who volunteered to fight were assigned to guard "the lower part of the
town," where Palacios Miranda and many of the elites lived.180 It was significant that the
paceños were posted in this particular spot. Since the protection of the local community and
personal property was one of the main reasons paceños agreed to neutrality, they would be
especially motivated if they were guarding their own land and homes.
The strong interest in protecting local property was also evident in other parts of the
peninsula. Commander DuPont recommended that those living on the interior be supplied
with “some arms” since they were “willing[] [to] undertake to keep down” those fighting
U.S. forces due to the tendency of the insurgents to plunder.181 In the words of one group of
bajacalifornios, “well behaved citizens” were unwilling to “suffer themselves to be
despoiled” by the “rapacity” of Pineda and his insurgents.182 Whenever the local community
was clearly harmed by the insurrection, open support for the U.S. increased. Whatever
course a person deemed most likely to benefit the local community was the course which he
or she pursued.183
Approximately 200 insurgents led by Pineda made their first assault on La Paz on
November 11, 1847. The fighting began at about 2 a.m. Pineda's forces stationed themselves
in three different locations and fired at the U.S. garrison for an hour without receiving much
in return. The Americans wanted to preserve their ammunition. After an hour was over, all
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was quiet until 9 a.m., when the attack began in earnest. Several hours of fighting resulted in
at least 50 of Pineda's men being able to enter the city. Palacios Miranda and the paceños
under his command were overcome by the insurgents and "the houses of the well-disposed
[to the Americans]" were "sacked;" Palacios Miranda’s town-house burned to the ground.
After burning or plundering several houses, the U.S. artillery finally drove the insurgents
away. They camped about six miles outside of the city and "hovered" there for ten days,
preparing for another attack.
Palacios Miranda and his followers had entirely sided with the enemy in order to
defend the local community from being overrun by insurgents. During the brief period of
respite, Lt. Col. Burton wrote to his superiors that Palacios Miranda proved himself
"deserving of every confidence."184 The casualties on the American side were not high: one
man was killed; two were "slightly wounded;" apparently no paceños lost their lives.
Burton’s comments indicate that Palacios Miranda and his men were not simply putting on a
facade of assisting the U.S. They were no longer just neutrals. The insurgents intended no
good for La Paz. The city was a garrison of the enemy to them; while to paceños, its
protection was their primary focus.185
In the afternoon of November 27th, Captain Pineda and an increased force of 350 men
once again attacked La Paz. This attack lasted about 5 hours before the insurgents were
driven away. During those five hours, areas outside the range of U.S. muskets were burned,
and much of the town was "reduced to ruins."186 Again, the casualties did not equal the
property loss: one U.S. soldier was "slightly wounded." After this second defeat, the
insurgents "maintained a light siege" of the city until December 8th, when Captain DuPont
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and the Cyane returned to the Bay of La Paz. With these additional men, small groups of
soldiers were able to travel outside the city to drive away the insurrectionists who had
remained in the area.
The presence of the Cyane also gave the evacuated paceños enough confidence to
return to the city. Being in their local community was more important to them than staying
away from direct U.S. influence or interaction with U.S. soldiers. These individuals were
eager to return to their homes as soon as it seemed safe to do so. They did not want to stay in
exile even though it removed them from immediate contact with the occupying army.187
Pineda and his men were apparently aware who among La Paz's residents were
traitorous enough to warrant punishment, although sources are not clear whose homes were
plundered or destroyed besides those of Palacios Miranda and Francisco Lope Urriza, the
town's alcalde.188 However, a list of bajacalifornio claimants who received reimbursement
after the war might provide some clues. Palacios Miranda received the most money by far
(over $6,000). There were several others who received over $1,000, and this amount could
easily be compensation for a ransacked house.189 These claimants were Francisco Villegas
and Teofilo Echevarría (who had both signed the conciliation agreement), Angel Lebriga,
Thomas Smith, William Mugan, Francisco Villagar, Pablo de la Toba (María Amparo Ruiz’s
brother-in-law), Ignacio Suerte, Miguel Choya, and Don Antonio Ruiz.190
The insistence of leaders like Burton that those who actively assisted the U.S. army be
reimbursed was a recognition that these individuals had been motivated by personal interests;
when those interests were harmed instead of helped by the presence of the U.S. army, they
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expected to be recompensed. The paceños were not actuated by any idea of sacrificing
themselves and their community for the sake of helping the United States; they were actuated
by the idea that helping the United States would benefit themselves and the community.
Although the insurrection did not end after the insurgents were driven out of the
vicinity of La Paz, no further attempts were made on the capital. The conflict continued in
other parts of the peninsula. When Burton received information indicating there was a plan
to attack La Paz again, he took action to secure the city. These precautions included
stationing another ship in the Bay of La Paz when the Cyane departed, and, a month later,
stationing additional companies of New York volunteers in the city. In late March 1848,
Burton led an expeditionary force to seek out and attack enemy outposts and headquarters
around the peninsula.
The fates of all of the insurrection’s leaders revolved around personal and local issues.
The expeditionary force quickly and easily captured Captain Pineda, when they found him
abandoned by his troops due to a disagreement. Personal disagreements caused Pineda to
lose his supporters. Mauricio Castro came into U.S. hands after local civil authorities
arrested him and handed him over. Castro had offended local people, causing them to hand
him over to the custody of the United States. Elsewhere, U.S. forces found and captured
Padre González. Even before this, Padre González had written to Captain DuPont; having
“become alarmed lest his property should be confiscated” he had assured DuPont that the
Mexican insurgents “had dispersed never to return.”191 DuPont remarked that the Padre had
long shown himself “heartily sick” of the insurgency.192 The Padre saw that the insurrection
was putting his property in Todos Santos in danger. Only by seeking to appease DuPont
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could he hope to protect his local interests.193 In one form or another, localism was evident in
all three cases.
When Lt. Col. Burton returned to La Paz in early April 1848, he was able to report
"'complete defeat and dispersion of the enemy's forces.'"194 Soon after, word arrived in La
Paz that the war was over. A treaty had indeed been signed in early February, although when
the paceños heard the news in late May, it had yet to be ratified. U.S. negotiator Nicholas
Trist had expressed a willingness to abandon claims to Baja California.195 While the reason
Mexico desired to maintain Baja California was openly expressed (the government believed
that it was necessary to protect the state of Sonora from future aggression) Nicholas Trist’s
offer to part with it was not, particularly since it was contrary to his instructions from the
President.196 In late June, with the end of the war finally confirmed, Burton received his
orders to withdraw all troops from the territory. La Paz and the rest of Baja California were
to remain in Mexican hands. Deeply concerned by these orders, Burton wrote to his
superiors, reminding them of the promise Shubrick had made to the paceños that the
peninsula would become part of the United States. Believing that many of them would be in
danger of retribution if they were "left to the mercy of Mexico," he requested means to
evacuate to the United States all those who desired to go.197
Included with this correspondence was a petition from the citizens of La Paz in
support of Burton's request. This petition reflected the high priority placed on both local and
personal interests. Although it was sent along with Burton’s request to evacuate the people,
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the petition made it clear that the preference of the paceños was to “separate” Baja California
from Mexico and “annex” it to the United States (or another “maritime power”).198 The
paceños had no desire to leave their community. Their hopes of preserving it remained. The
petitioners’ declared purpose was to “promote the true happiness of this Country.”199 In
other words, they were seeking not only the welfare of individual citizens but of the
community as a whole. Simply moving the people was not ideal. For reasons of family,
economy, and community, the people would much prefer to remain where they were.
Interestingly, the petition took time to detail the resentment of the citizens against the
interference of Sonora and Sinaloa in the affairs of local community, expressing fears that
said interference would result in a dangerous situation for the local population. But again,
the preferred response was not the removal of paceños, but the removal of the national tie
making Sonora and Sinaloa feel entitled to meddle in local matters. The petitioners spoke
sarcastically about the “patriotism” of the leader which those states intended to send to the
peninsula once the U.S. evacuated. They believed that his purpose was more personal than
patriotic: he wanted to “despoil[]...the very insignificant property which [the insurrectionists]
had spared” the locals.200 In the opinion of the petitioners, self-interest, not the welfare of
Baja California or the welfare of the Mexican nation, was his priority. In contrast, the
assembly members claimed they were motivated by their interest in fostering the local
community and its people; this could best be accomplished by joining themselves to a nation
that would provide “shelter, protect[ion], and support.”201 Their desires were not for a strong
centralized governing authority; they wanted to be citizens of a nation that offered an
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atmosphere in which the local community could thrive—not by direct interference from
national leaders but by shielding the community from potential dangers and providing
guidance or assistance when necessary.
While Burton and the petitioners awaited a response from U.S. leaders, multiple ships
arrived in the Bay of La Paz in preparation for the transport of U.S. troops to Alta California.
In mid-July, a response came to Burton's hand. Commodores Jones and Shubrick
discouraged the bajacalifornios from open rebellion against Mexico, but agreed to relocate to
Alta California all "those who wished political asylum."202 Burton received power to decide
who deserved compensation or reimbursement from the United States, and who should be
relocated. Only those "who had given their allegiance to the United States" needed political
asylum.203 On August 31, 1848, the evacuation of the political refugees was completed. The
more active traitors bid farewell to the town of La Paz and their life in Mexico—but not
necessarily to their identification as californios.
Conclusion
Localism was a defining characteristic of communities like La Paz, a natural result of
history and circumstance. While the people did not lack a mejicano identity and spirit, the
bajacalifornio and paceño identities dominated, particularly when there was a conflict. Had
the choice never presented itself, no doubt the vast majority of paceños would never have
acted counter to their national identity in spite of their resentment toward the central
government of Mexico. But when faced with two options, defense of national honor or
preservation of the local community, they followed the latter course. Even those who
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objected to the surrender of the peninsula had clear local motivations for doing so. Defense
of the national honor alone was simply not enough prompt paceños to take up arms against
the U.S. invaders to the detriment of the local community.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
There were several differences between the invasion and occupation of Santa Fe
and the invasion and occupation of La Paz, but one common feature was the prevalence
of localism. A brief look at the fates of both towns and their citizens proves that even
after the war, localism continued to have a powerful influence, regardless of whether the
community was part of Mexico or the United States. For example, the power of localism
to override national patriotism was evident in the fact that most santafesinos elected to
remain in their homes instead of migrating to remain in Mexico. After the war, the
Mexican government made “laws favoring the return of Mexicans” from territories seized
by the United States, hoping to encourage them to settle in the states which made up the
new northern border of the country. Very few nuevomexicanos elected to take advantage
of these repatriation laws. It was almost entirely the “least fortunate” who chose to
move. The least fortunate not only had the most to gain from the government incentives,
but they also had the fewest ties to the local community (owning no land and having only
minimal involvement with the local economy). Reluctant traitor Juan Vigil y Alarid was
one of the few elite to relocate so he could stay in Mexico. However, he apparently
returned to New Mexico in later life, evidence of his continuing battle between local and
national loyalties.204
Localism was clearly central to the politics of New Mexico territory after it
became part of the United States. This was no surprise as elite nuevomexicanos
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dominated the legislature. One outside observer described New Mexican politics as
obsessed with local interests. The two major parties that developed were the Mexican
Party and the American Party. There were Anglos and native-born nuevomexicanos on
both sides, and the parties shared many localistic goals. It was their methods for
achieving them that differed. For example, there was a debate over local culture: the
Mexican Party sought to preserve as much of the pre-conquest society as possible while
the latter desired assimilation into U.S. society. Both parties advocated for statehood,
though they opposed it when the proposal came from the other side. The arguments
against statehood were predictably local: the community was “not ready in [its] progress
toward modernity” and the “burden of taxation would increase.”205 Legislators also
worked hard to “obtain[] resources for their home community," and they did what they
could to increase the power of local community leaders.206 The politics of Santa Fe
continued to be driven by the people’s desire to do what was best for the local community
as opposed to what would best serve the nation to which they now belonged.
Catholicism was no longer the national religion, but it continued to be a powerful
influence in the local community and it continued to reflect Santa Fe’s localistic views.
An unexpected result of New Mexico’s transfer to the United States was that the Vatican
decided to create a New Mexican diocese. Priests in New Mexico had previously been
under the authority of the diocese in Durango, nearly 1,000 miles away. They had
become accustomed to operating independently. The new bishop threatened the
“autonomy” they had long enjoyed, so the bishop faced a great deal of opposition
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whenever he tried to make changes to the local way of doing things.207 Clearly, localism
continued to be a dominant feature in Santa Fe and New Mexico for years after the war.
Under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo the fate of La Paz differed from that of
Santa Fe, but like Santa Fe, the town and its citizens continued to be swayed by localism,
whether they chose to remain in Baja California or relocate to the United States. The
total number of paceños who emigrated is unknown, but the total number of
bajacalifornios was probably somewhere between 350 and 500. The “immense
emigration” damaged “the prosperity of the peninsula.”208 A large number of these were
paceños, but residents in other towns such as San José del Cabo also chose to move.
Among the refugees were Francisco Palacios Miranda and his wife, and María Amparo
Ruiz with her mother, brother, sister, and brother-in-law. It is difficult to discover the fate
of most of these emigrants, but apparently many of the bajacalifornios who left La Paz
out of concern for their safety returned to the city in the decades that followed. Mexico’s
repatriation laws benefited them more than it did nuevomexicanos: instead of calling
upon them to leave their local community, the laws called them back home. Palacios
Miranda and María Amparo Ruiz were not among the repatriates, but Ruiz’s sister and
brother-in-law were.209 Ruiz and Palacios Miranda had strong reasons that would force
them to overcome their localistic ties to La Paz: Palacios Miranda would have faced
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punishment as the most obvious traitor among the paceños, and Ruiz was married to an
officer in the U.S. army.
As for the fate of La Paz itself, the Mexican government learned some lessons
from the town’s cooperation with the United States, recognizing the power of localism in
the community. In 1849, the Chamber of Deputies presented plans to the Mexican
Congress to revitalize Baja California. This presentation included the following
explanation:
...the necessities of that country...demand instant
remedies...without which it may remain erased from
the list of towns that make an integral part of the
Mexican republic, because it will remain depopulated
lacking an organization analogous to its local
circumstances…210
The first proposed remedy was to encourage Mexican colonization to replenish the loss
of population. However, the most pressing need, the proposal recognized, was for the
central government to stop ignoring Baja California, and create laws more suitable to
local needs. The central government’s inaction and insensitivity to local conditions
created the unfortunate circumstances leading to treason. The needs of the local
community were paramount to the people, and the government needed to act accordingly.
In spite of these efforts to address local needs, little actually changed in Baja
California after the U.S.-Mexican War. The lack of resources and the associated
dissatisfaction with the federal government remained, and discontent among the
population occasionally led to rebellion and even treason. One Baja California governor
had to demand a “forced loan” to “keep the loyalty of [the] garrison.”211 Tellingly, the
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peninsula’s tenuous situation would only be ameliorated once two major local concerns
were addressed: (1) a more effective local government was implemented, and (2)
improvements in transportation made resources less scarce and the community less
isolated.212
La Paz and Santa Fe are certainly not the only communities in history who have
allowed local interests to guide their choices. Some might even argue that it is to be
expected. But the fact is that there are some cities which primarily identify with the
nation to which they belong and others which view the world first and foremost through
the lens of the local community. Consider, for example, reactions in the United States to
the September 11th attacks. The declared target of the attacks was the U.S. as a nation,
although strikes were limited to Washington, D.C., and New York. National patriotism
ran high throughout the country. Nevertheless, within the city of New York, localism was
evident. Homes and businesses flew “I [heart] New York” banners as often as they
displayed the American flag. New Yorkers saw it as an attack on their local community
as much or more than an attack on the nation. Compare this to the reaction after Pearl
Harbor, in which localism was hardly manifest at all. There are several reasons why
localism might be more prominent in New York than in Pearl Harbor, and it would be
enlightening to explore them.
Localism is not a new concept, nor have historians neglected its study. However,
they usually consider it only as part of a broader idea, and rarely do they single it out by
that name. While I am not necessarily advocating for historians to use the term
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“localism” in their work, I believe it would be useful for historians to have the term in
their repertoire to ensure they take the time to reflect on its relevance to their current
research. For example, localism is clearly relevant to the history of states’ rights in the
United States and Mexico. Any research into rivalries and disputes between communities
should take localism into consideration. Historians must frequently decide whether a
local historical fact is just that—local—or whether it can be used to draw conclusions
relating to a broader area.
Although localism may often be only one factor to consider in a larger study, it
does deserve some individual attention, particularly in studies of the U.S.-Mexican War
and the borderlands. In the context of the war, it would be interesting to analyze how
localism was exploited by the U.S. military, and combated by the Mexican government.
In the context of both the War and more generalized borderlands history, it would be
helpful to analyze a broader spectrum of communities to find more definite patterns that
foster localism. Finally, borderlands historians should examine in more detail localism’s
influence on identity, religion, and culture.
Localism was a powerful force in the U.S.-Mexican War that must not be
overlooked. It is a force that still has power today to guide individual and community
choices. The conflict between local and national outlooks was and is evident in people's
lives, and it is important that historians recognize and acknowledge it, particularly in any
study of the U.S.-Mexican War and the borderlands.
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